IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-40792

TEXAS TOP COP SHOP, INC., ET AL.,

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES,

V.

MERRICK GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, $ET\,AL.$,

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES' RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS' EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL

ON INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 4:24-CV-478 HON. AMOS L. MAZZANT

December 17, 2024

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CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

The undersigned counsel certifies that the following listed persons and entities as described in the fourth sentence of Rule 28.2.1 have an interest in the outcome of this case. These representations are made so that the judges of this Court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.

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Respectfully,

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The Court should refuse the government's late-in-the-day request to throw much of the Nation's private sector into chaos.

The district court enjoined the initial compliance date of the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) because this statute relies on the same faulty constitutional justification condemned by the Supreme Court in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), and because allowing it to take effect would irreparably injure the rights of the plaintiffs, including the National Federation of Independent Business and its approximately 300,000 members, as well as tens of millions other business entities subject to its sweeping mandate. After waiting a week to seek a stay in the district court, the government barreled ahead to seek the same relief from this Court on a timeline that, if it prevailed, would leave regulated parties as little as a single business day in the middle of the holiday season to comply with a never-beforeimplemented reporting regime that the government recognizes presents enormous compliance challenges. Indeed, those challenges were the government's own justification for pushing back the compliance deadline for more than three years from the earliest possible date, forgoing the

same putative benefits that the government now contends threaten it with irreparable injury.

The government comes nowhere near justifying its request. On the merits, the government's own justification for the CTA—that it "imposes reporting requirements on corporations" because they could "engage in various economic transactions," Gov. Mot. at 9—parallels the government's failed argument that Congress's Commerce Clause power authorized imposing an insurance requirement on individuals merely because they could "engage in a health care transaction" in the future. See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 557. As the district court held, regulation based on mere "existence," whether people or entities, is "exactly what the Supreme Court rejected." A41. The government's fallback merits arguments are equally untenable.

The equities are also not close. The district court's preliminary injunction serves to preserve the status quo against imposition of a neverbefore-implemented reporting regime. It prevents irreparable injury to Plaintiffs in the forms of compliance costs and injury to their rights under the First and Fourth Amendments—claims the district court did not reach at this stage. It similarly preserves the district court's jurisdiction

to decide all of those claims, which may otherwise be mooted if Plaintiffs are forced to submit to the CTA's unlawful mandate and their injuries are thereby consummated. By contrast, preserving the status quo threatens no meaningful injury to the government, based on its own representations in setting compliance deadlines that years-long delays in CTA implementation were warranted. Finally, the tens of millions of other business entities subject to the CTA would be ill-served by a last-minute reinstatement of a reporting deadline that the media and the government have widely reported is off. There is no good reason for this Court to unleash chaos in the last business days of 2024.

Finally, the government's complaints about the scope of the injunction are misplaced. The court below entered a nationwide injunction after the government suggested that it would be infeasible to provide relief solely for Plaintiffs, including NFIB's members, without the equivalent of a nationwide injunction. That was a sound exercise of the district court's equitable discretion, warranted by the facts, and independently justified as "appropriate process to postpone the effective date," 5 U.S.C. § 705, of the CTA's implementing regulation.

The requested stay should be denied.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Legal Background

Congress enacted the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA), 31 U.S.C. § 5336, on January 21, 2021. The CTA mandated that any "reporting company," file with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) reports of all its "beneficial ownership information." 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(A).

A "reporting company" is an entity "created by the filing of a document with a secretary of state or a similar office under the law of a State or Indian Tribe" or "formed under the law of a foreign country and registered to do business in the United States by the filing of a document with a secretary of state or a similar office under the laws of a State or Indian Tribe." *Id.* at § 5336(a)(11). The CTA exempts large companies (those employing more than 20 people and generating more than \$5,000,000 per year in gross revenue), publicly traded companies, most businesses involved in finance, and many nonprofits. *Id.* at § (a)(11)(B).

Reporting companies are required to identify, and provide photo identification of, their "beneficial owners," which includes every natural person who "directly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement,

understanding, relationship, or otherwise—(i) exercises substantial control over the entity; or (ii) owns or controls not less than 25 percent of the ownership interests of the entity[.]" *Id.* at §§ (a)(1), (a)(3), (b)(1). Entities must update this information if it changes. *Id.* at §§ (a)(2), (b)(1)(D). Violations of the reporting mandate are subject to substantial civil and criminal penalties. *Id.* at § (h)(3).

FinCEN's implementing regulations (the "Reporting Rule") require preexisting reporting companies to report their beneficial ownership information by January 1, 2025. 31 CFR § 1010.380(a)(1).

B. The CTA's Burden on the Public and Plaintiffs

As FinCEN recognized, the CTA and Reporting Rule "will have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities." 87 Fed. Reg. 59498, 59550 (Sept. 30, 2022). "FinCEN estimates that there will be approximately 32.6 million existing reporting companies and 5 million new reporting companies formed each year." *Id.* at 59585. Compliance in the first year alone would take 126.3 million hours and impose costs of \$22.7 billion. *Id.* at 59585-86.

Plaintiffs are among those affected. See ECF No. 6-2 at ¶¶ 3-4 (Schneider Decl.); ECF No. 6-3 at ¶ 4 (Data Comm Decl.); ECF No. 6-4 at

¶¶ 2-3 (Straayer Decl.); ECF No. 6-5 at ¶¶ 3-6 (Goulart Decl.); ECF No. 6-6 at ¶¶ 3-4 (Lewis Decl.). One plaintiff, the National Federation of Independent Business, Inc., is a membership organization with nearly 300,000 member businesses. ECF No. 6-7 at ¶¶ 4, 6 (Milito Decl.). While NFIB is exempt from the CTA, most of its members, including plaintiffs Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc. and Data Com For Business, Inc., must comply. *Id.* at ¶ 4.

C. Proceedings Below

Plaintiffs sued in May 2024, alleging that the CTA and Reporting Rule violate the Tenth Amendment, burden associational rights in violation of the First Amendment, and violate the Fourth Amendment by compelling disclosure of private information. ECF No. 1. They quickly moved for a preliminary injunction of all enforcement of the CTA and Reporting Rule. ECF Nos. 6, 6-1. In response, the government argued that Plaintiffs' motion was *premature* because "[t]he parties [] have more than six months to resolve this case through dispositive motions before any injury could be deemed imminent." ECF No. 18, at 8. At an October 9, 2024, hearing on Plaintiffs' motion, Plaintiffs proposed, as an alternative to a nationwide injunction, a limited injunction extending

only to Plaintiffs and NFIB's members. Ex. A at 3 (hearing transcript). The government, however, argued that relief would infeasibly "frustrate the goals and aims of the CTA" and amount to "effective nationwide relief." Ex. A at 54.

On December 3, 2024, the district court enjoined the CTA and Reporting Rule and stayed the Rule's "compliance deadline" under APA § 705. ECF No. 30 at 79. It determined that the "CTA is likely unconstitutional as outside of Congress's power. Because the Reporting Rule implements the CTA, it is likely unconstitutional for the same reasons." *Id.* At the same time, Plaintiffs "met their burden to show that they will suffer unrecoverable compliance costs absent emergency relief, they have met their burden to show that the CTA and Reporting Rule threaten substantial, imminent, non-speculative, and irreparable harm" and "because the CTA and Reporting Rule substantially threaten their constitutional rights." *Id.* at 31-32.

The injunction was widely covered in the news and law-firm client alerts informing regulated parties that the January 1 deadline was off.

See Ex. B (Clase Decl.). FinCEN itself published a notice stating that

"reporting companies are not currently required to file [CTA reports] and are not subject to liability if they fail to do so[.]" *Id*.

Although the government was quick to file a notice of appeal, ECF No. 35, it waited over a week to seek a stay from any court, filing a motion with the district court after hours on December 11 and demanding a ruling within two days, without apprising the district court of that fact. See Order, ECF No. 36. Without giving Plaintiffs time to respond or the district court to rule, the government then proceeded to seek a stay from this Court on December 13th, requesting a ruling "no later than December 27, 2024"—one business day before the January 1 deadline it seeks to reinstate. Gov. Mot. at 4.

On December 17, 2024, the district court denied the requested stay in a 9-page opinion. Ex. C. Among other things, the court concluded that the equities did not warrant a stay, as "any interest the Government has in preserving its efforts in furtherance of the CTA are superseded by the CTA's grave constitutional flaws." *Id.* at 8-9.

ARGUMENT

"A stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result." *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009) (citation omitted). For a stay pending review, this Court considers four factors: (1) whether the requester makes a "strong showing" that it's likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the requester will be irreparably injured without a stay; (3) whether other interested parties will be irreparably injured by a stay; and (4) where the public interest lies. *Id.* at 426. "The first two factors are the most critical." *Valentine v. Collier*, 956 F.3d 797, 801 (5th Cir. 2020).

The government's admission that it must make a "strong showing" on the merits and irreparable injury, Gov. Mot. at 7, belies its suggestion that a lower standard applies where a federal statute has been enjoined, id. at 3. It is irrelevant that the Supreme Court has sometimes applied a heightened standard to injunction requests, see *Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC*, 507 U.S. 1301, 1301 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., in chambers), on the basis (inapplicable here) that a "significantly higher" standard than ordinarily "required for a stay" is warranted for it to "grant judicial intervention that has been withheld by lower courts," *Lux v.*

Rodrigues, 561 U.S. 1306, 1307 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (citation omitted). Nor is it relevant to this Court's review that the Supreme Court has sometimes granted stays in cases subject to direct appeal under its non-discretionary jurisdiction, without the benefit of appeals-court review. Bowen v. Kendrick, 483 U.S. 1304, 1304 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., in chambers); cf. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 862, 885 (1997) (affirming preliminary injunction of Communications Decency Act).

The government cannot carry its burden. The district court correctly held that the CTA and Reporting Rule are likely unconstitutional. And the equities cut hard against the government's push to implement a first-of-its-kind reporting regime, with all of the harms it poses, on a breakneck schedule.

A. The Government Fails to Make a "Strong Showing" of Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The CTA is unlawful because it exceeds the federal government's limited, enumerated powers.

1. The Commerce Power Does Not Support the CTA

The CTA's unprecedented scope crosses a line long reserved for the states by regulating a business entity's *status* instead of its *actions*. In

NFIB v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court rejected a Commerce Clause justification for the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate, holding that it "compel[led] individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product, on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce." 567 U.S. at 552 (emphasis in original). The CTA suffers the same defect—it "compels" reporting companies to file beneficial ownership reports with the Federal Government "on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce." See id. The district court correctly concluded that "construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate companies precisely because the Government does not know who substantially benefits from their ownership would similarly 'open a new and potentially vast domain to congressional authority." A44 (quoting NFIB, 567 U.S. at 552).

That the CTA regulates no activity is apparent on its face. It defines a class of "reporting companies," 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11), and then requires them, based on their mere existence, to file reports, *id*. § 5336(b)(1)(A). It does not, as the government claims (at 9–10), regulate or prohibit any transaction; it does not even refer to or describe any

transaction, which is why the government is unable to quote any statutory language doing so.

In regulating inactivity based on mere existence, the CTA's reporting mandate is indistinguishable from the ACA's insurance mandate. The insurance mandate compelled the uninsured to purchase health insurance, which the government justified "on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce." 567 U.S. at 551. Specifically, the ACA required "individuals who are not exempt and do not receive health insurance through a third party" to purchase "minimum essential' health insurance coverage." Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A) (emphasis added). Likewise, the CTA requires non-exempt entities to disclose beneficial-ownership information to the federal government, on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce. See Gov. Mot. at 10 (arguing as much). But NFIB squarely rejects the proposition that Congress may "justify federal regulation by pointing to the effect of inaction on commerce." 567 U.S. at 552; see also id. at 657 (joint dissent).

NFIB also forecloses the government's argument (at 10–11) it is enough that corporations are "authorized to engage in various economic

transactions" and may have "the propensity to do so." That argument runs headfirst into NFIB's rejection of the "proposition that Congress may dictate the conduct of an individual today because of prophesied future activity." Id. at 557. After all, it was taken as given that every individual would "engage in a health care transaction" at some point, but "that does not authorize Congress to direct them" into action. Id. "Any police power to regulate individuals as such, as opposed to their activities, remains vested in the States." Id. That applies specifically in this context: "Every State in this country has enacted laws regulating corporate governance," but federal power reaches only "transactions" that implicate federal interests. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89-90 (1987).

To the extent the government argues that the effect on commerce of not disclosing beneficial ownership information supports the CTA under a combination of the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause, that too is contrary to *NFIB*. The power to regulate inactivity, it reasoned, would give Congress "the extraordinary ability to create the necessary predicate to the exercise of an enumerated power." *NFIB*, 567 U.S. at 560; *see also id*. at 657 (joint dissent). And that is anything but

"incidental" to the exercise of the Commerce power and therefore not a "proper" means of executing it. *Id.* at 560. For the same reason, the government's defense (at 10) of the CTA as part of a "larger regulatory scheme" also fails. *See id.* at 560-61 (distinguishing *Gonzales v. Raich*, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), on that basis). The premise is also wrong: unlike prohibiting home non-commercial intrastate cultivation of marijuana, which facilitated the interstate-commerce ban in *Raich*, the CTA is in no way integral to various other statutory schemes that predated its enactment by years or decades. Confirming as much is FinCEN's yearslong delay in implementing the CTA's reporting requirement, which is at odds with the claim that inability to mandate that reporting would "frustrate" any other statutory scheme. *See Raich*, 545 U.S. at 19.

At bottom, the government's arguments boil down to a vague assertion that Congress may exercise plenary authority, irrespective of the limits of its enumerated powers, in any field it has legitimately entered. If that were so, then Congress's longstanding regulation in the healthcare field would have supported the ACA's insurance mandate. Of course, it did not.

2. The CTA Is Not a Necessary and Proper Means to Further Other Enumerated Powers

As a fallback, the government leans on the Necessary and Proper Clause, the "last, best hope of those who defend *ultra vires* congressional action." *Printz v. United States*, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997). It insists that the CTA facilitates Congress's "tax, foreign-affairs, and foreign-commerce powers." Gov. Mot. at 12. What these theories share in common is that they brook no limiting principle: if the CTA's sweeping reporting mandate is necessary and proper to exercise of any of these powers, then there is no limit to the information that the government could demand citizens report. That is fatal, because the Clause is confined to "incidental powers" and "does not license the exercise of any great substantive and independent powers beyond those specifically enumerated." *NFIB*, 567 U.S. at 559 (cleaned up).

a. The government proffers the vague suggestion that "the reporting requirements would be 'highly useful" to "tax administration." Gov. Mot. at 13. Because the CTA imposes no tax, it cannot be justified as an exercise of the taxing power.

Nor is it "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" the taxing power. "When the inquiry is whether a federal law has sufficient

links to an enumerated power to be within the scope of federal authority, the analysis depends not on the number of links in the congressionalpower chain but on the strength of the chain." *United States v. Comstock*, 560 U.S. 126, 150 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Here, there is no chain, because the government fails to identify any tax to which the CTA connects. As below, the government cannot cite a single case upholding a regulatory measure on this basis "when the statute at issue does not, in some way, generate some revenue." ECF No. 31 at 71. And it is difficult to imagine, if the CTA passes muster, what information the government could not demand citizens disclose: their assets, friends and romances, travel, and more—all would prove "highly useful" to the tax collector. Yet, as with the information demanded by the CTA, none of these are in service of any particular tax. And the power to compel such disclosure is by no means an "incidental" one—to the point that it implicates the Fourth Amendment.

b. The government's cursory "foreign affairs power" argument (at 13) is similarly unbounded, assuming that any domestic matter that happens to implicate foreign policy or diplomatic interests is within

Congress's power. The CTA implicates foreign affairs no more than any other domestic measure.

The "powers of external sovereignty" are truly international, including the power "to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, [and] to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316, 318 (1936). This Court has distinguished between permissible state laws that "are well within the realm of traditional state responsibilities" and those that have improperly "infringed on any exclusive federal powers." Dunbar v. Seger-Thomschitz, 615 F.3d 574, 579 (5th Cir. 2010).

The foreign affairs power does not *enlarge* federal power over domestic matters. The "Executive is not free from the ordinary controls and checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue." *Zivotofsky v. Kerry*, 576 U.S. 1, 21 (2015). Thus, when confronted with a statutory reading of an international treaty that threatened to "dramatically intrude[] upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction," the Supreme Court unanimously adopted a narrow interpretation to avoid such constitutional doubt. *Bond v. United States*, 572 U.S. 844, 857, 859-60 (2014); *see also Dunbar*, 615 F.3d at 579 (issues "within the realm of

traditional state responsibilities" are not barred by deference on issues of foreign affairs)

The CTA applies exclusively to entities that register "with a secretary of state or a similar office under the law of a State or Indian Tribe." See 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11). Its only incidental connection to international affairs is that certain entities "formed under the law of a foreign country" must comply if and only if they are "registered to do business in the United States by the filing of a document with a secretary of state or a similar office under the laws of a State or Indian Tribe." *Id*. More obliquely, the Act provides the "sense of Congress," which pointed to a desire to "bring the United States into compliance with international anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism standards," but this is simply a goal of conforming to policies adopted by other countries, not an invocation of any specific relations with a foreign state. See 31 U.S.C. § 5336 note § 5(E).

With its complete lack of international nexus, the CTA thus does not implicate any of the reasons animating the implied powers over foreign affairs, much less the danger that a court's scrutiny or a state's laws might upset a unified federal position with foreign states. *See Hines*

v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941). A possible international application of a domestic statute is not a magic escape valve for all limits on federal authority. See Bond, 572 U.S. at 883 (Scalia, J., concurring).

c. The CTA does not "effectuate" the foreign commerce power for the same reason it does not effectuate the Commerce Clause: the constitutional language "regulate commerce," on its own or in combination with the Necessary and Proper Clause, does not reach inactivity.

B. The Equitable Factors Weigh Heavily Against Reinstating the CTA's Burdens and Compliance Deadline With Only Days To Go

1. The Government's Claims of Injury Are Overblown

The government cannot be deprived of the benefits of a law that is not yet effective. Conflating the CTA's hoped-for benefits with entitlements, the government contends (at 14–15) that the injunction "threatens significant and irreparable harm to the government and public," and "disrupts the government's efforts to combat international financial crime, including the financing of terrorism." But the district court's injunction could not "disrupt" anything because it merely delayed an *upcoming* effective date and thereby *preserved* the status quo.

In any event, the government's dire claims of injury are belied by its own delay in implementing the CTA's reporting requirement. The CTA was enacted in 2021 and directed FinCEN to promulgate implementing regulations within a year that would require compliance within two years of becoming effective. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(5), (b)(1)(B). Under ordinary rulemaking timelines, FinCEN could have required compliance as early as mid-2021 or as late as January 1, 2026, given that the Reporting Rule took effect on January 1, 2024. See 87 Fed. Reg. at 59511.

The agency chose to delay the compliance deadline for over three years. It did so based on its weighing of "the benefit to law enforcement and national security agencies" against "the burdens imposed on reporting companies." *Id.* And even then it left the door open to providing further "extensions to the filing periods for initial, updated, or corrected reports." *Id.*; *see also* 88 Fed. Reg. 83499, 83500 (Nov. 30, 2023) (justifying 90-day extension of related CTA reporting deadline based on compliance burdens). This outright contradicts the government's assertion (at 15) that a relatively short delay while the courts resolve the CTA's constitutionality would "jeopardize" anything.

The CTA's timing provisions also vitiate the government's claim (at 14–15) that the injunction causes it special injury by preventing it from "effectuating" a statute. By FinCEN's own reading, the statute doesn't require the reporting mandate to kick in for another year. 87 Fed. Reg. at 59498.

The government presents no authority for its strange argument (at 16-17) that its publicity campaign weighs in favor of staying an injunction of a likely unconstitutional statute. The government's claim of urgency is contradicted by its leisurely pace in waiting eight days to seek a stay. See Daily Instruments Corp. v. Heidt, 998 F.Supp. 2d 553, 570 (S.D. Tex. 2014) ("Absent a good explanation, a substantial period of delay militates against" an injunction.). In any event, the injunction does not prevent any reporting company from filing based on the government's publicity campaign. And perhaps more would have had the government been forthcoming about its plan to seek a stay, rather than broadcast to the public that companies "are not currently required to file beneficial ownership information with FinCEN[.]" FinCEN, Beneficial Ownership Information, fincen.gov, https://www.fincen.gov/boi.

The government's argument also loses sight of the principle that the "historical purpose of a preliminary injunction...is to maintain the status quo pending litigation." *Louisiana v. United States Dep't of Educ.*, No. 24-30399, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 17886, at *6 (5th Cir. July 17, 2024) (unpublished). That weighs heavily in favor an injunction that preserves the status quo by delaying the implementation date of a novel measure. *Id*.

2. A Stay Would Irreparably Injure Plaintiffs and Others Subject to the CTA's Reporting Mandate

Even as it conjures fantastical claims of injury for itself, the government largely overlooks the obvious irreparable injuries that a stay would impose on Appellees. Those include not only non-recoupable compliance costs, but also deprivation of constitutional rights and potential mootness of their legal claims. And then there is the prospect of utter chaos if the January 1 deadline springs back into force with only days for regulated parties, including Plaintiffs, to comply.

a. "An irreparable harm is one for which there is no adequate remedy at law." Book People, Inc. v. Wong, 91 F.4th 318, 340 (5th Cir. 2024) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The "nonrecoverable costs of complying with a putatively invalid regulation typically constitute

irreparable harm." Rest. Law Ctr. v. United States DOL, 66 F.4th 593, 597 (5th Cir. 2023).

The district court correctly found that Plaintiff-Appellees will suffer irreparable harm because they must expend unrecoupable resources to comply with the CTA on January 1. Not only have the plaintiffs each averred that they would need to spend time and effort to make the required filings, but they would also need to incur legal expenses. *See* Ex. A at ¶ 10, Ex. B. at ¶ 9, Ex. C at ¶ 10, Ex. D at ¶ 12, Ex. E at ¶ 23, Ex. F at ¶ 5. These "nonrecoverable compliance" costs constitute irreparable harm. *See Rest. Law Ctr.*, 66 F.4th at 597.

b. Compliance will infringe Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, including their First Amendment associational rights, which also causes them irreparable harm. *Book People Inc.*, 91 F.4th at 341. "When an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary." *Id.* at 340-41 (quotation marks omitted). And when a law or regulation even "threatens" First Amendment rights, a plaintiff suffers an irreparable injury. *Id.*

c. A stay pending appeal risks mooting Plaintiffs' First and Fourth Amendment claims because it would compel them to make the disclosures that form the basis of these claims. The injunction properly serves "to preserve the court's ability to render a meaningful decision on the merits," *Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co.*, 760 F.2d 618, 627 (5th Cir. 1985), and a stay would only undermine that.

d. The government has not wrestled with the practical consequences of *suddenly reinstating* the compliance deadline with just days left to comply. Tens of millions of business entities are subject to the CTA's reporting mandate, and the injunction and its effect have been widely publicized by the media and FinCEN itself. *See* Ex. B. If the deadline springs back into force with just a few business days remaining in the middle of the holiday season, the result will be utter chaos, as those responsible for reporting scramble to understand and fulfill obligations that the government informed them only weeks ago had been postponed.

C. The Scope of the Injunction Is Appropriate

The district court properly entered a nationwide injunction after the government suggested that it was infeasible to provide relief only to only Plaintiffs and NFIB's members without the equivalent of a

nationwide injunction. The district court was not wrong to take the government at its word, and the scope of its injunction is supported by two independent bases: (1) its inherent equitable authority, as exercised commensurate with the need to provide the plaintiffs relief, and (2) the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides a firm basis to postpone the filing deadline imposed by the Reporting Rule.

"Crafting a preliminary injunction is an exercise of discretion and judgment, often dependent as much on the equities of a given case as the substance of the legal issues it presents." Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U.S. 571, 579 (2017). The equities of this case clearly support the district court's injunction. Having found the CTA likely violated Plaintiffs rights and that compliance would cause them irreparable harm, the district court entered the equitable relief necessary to prevent that harm and preserve the status quo, based on the government's position the district court "cannot provide Plaintiffs with meaningful relief without, in effect, enjoining the CTA and Reporting Rule nationwide." A77. The government further argued that even an injunction limited to NFIB's membership "would totally frustrate the goals and aims of the CTA and its compliance standards," because of

inconsistent application. Ex. A at 54. In raising the stakes, the government made an "all-or-nothing" bet and lost.

The injunction is also justified under the APA, which authorizes courts to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action ... found to be ... contrary to constitutional right[s]," 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B), and to "issue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of an agency action or to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings," id. § 705. The reporting deadline was set by the Reporting Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. at 59592, and the district court therefore had unquestionable authority to "postpone" it. That it did so as to all filers was justified by APA Section 705 itself, the government's suggestion that narrower relief was infeasible, and the court's determination that the Rule would likely be subject to the APA's "set aside" remedy. See Airlines for Am. v. DOT, 110 F.4th 672, 677 (5th Cir. 2024) (postponing airline-fee-disclosure rule's effective date notwithstanding that not all airlines appeared as petitioners).

The government's arguments (at 20–21) against the application of standard principles of associational standing and remedies recognized by decades of precedent, *e.g.*, *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975), are

misplaced in this Court and at this stage and can only be understood as an act of desperation.

CONCLUSION

The government's request for a stay should be denied.

December 17, 2024

Respectfully,
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this document complies with Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 27(d). It is printed in Century Schoolbook, a

proportionately spaced font, and includes 4984 words, excluding items

enumerated in Rule 32(f). I relied on my word processor, Microsoft Word,

to obtain the count.

Respectfully,

<u>/s/ Caleb Kruckenberg</u>

Caleb Kruckenberg

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on December 17, 2024, this document was electronically filed using the Court's CM/ECF system, which sent notification of such filing to all counsel of record.

Respectfully,

/s/ Caleb Kruckenberg
Caleb Kruckenberg

EXHIBIT A

1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SHERMAN DIVISION
3	TEXAS TOP COP SHOP, INC., DOCKET 4:24-CV-478
4	ET AL OCTOBER 9, 2024
5	VS. 9:00 A.M.
6	ATTORNEY GENERAL MERRICK SHERMAN, TEXAS
7	
8	VOLUME 1 OF 1, PAGES 1 THROUGH 67
9	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING
10	BEFORE THE HONORABLE AMOS L. MAZZANT, III,
11	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
12	
13	
14	FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: CALEB KRUCKENBERG CHRISTIAN CLASE
15	THE CENTER FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 1100 CONNECTICUT AVENUE NW,
16	SUITE 625 WASHINGTON, DC 20036
17	
18	FOR THE DEFENDANTS: FAITH LOWRY DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - CIVIL
19	1100 L STREET WASHINGTON, DC 20005
20	WASHINGION, DC 20003
21	COURT REPORTER: CHRISTINA L. BICKHAM, CRR, RDR FEDERAL OFFICIAL REPORTER
	101 EAST PECAN
22	SHERMAN, TX 75090
23	
24	PROCEEDINGS RECORDED USING MECHANICAL STENOGRAPHY;
25	TRANSCRIPT PRODUCED VIA COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION.

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            (Open court, all parties present.)
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            THE COURT: Good morning. Please be seated.
            We're here in case 4:24-cv-478, Texas Top Cop
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   Shop, et al versus Garland, et al.
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            And for the Plaintiffs?
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            MR. KRUCKENBERG: Good morning, your Honor. Caleb
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   Kruckenberg for the Plaintiffs. I'm joined by my
 8
   colleague, Christian Clase. And I'll just note that I'm
   joined by Russell Straayer, who's one of the named
   Plaintiffs, and he's at the table beside me.
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11
            THE COURT: Okay. Very good.
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            And for the Defense?
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            MS. LOWRY: Good morning, your Honor. Faith Lowry
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   for the Defendants.
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            THE COURT: And where did you -- where did y'all
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   come from?
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            MS. LOWRY: I am now down in San Antonio, so it
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   was a short flight up to Love.
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            THE COURT: Not too bad.
20
            MR. KRUCKENBERG: And, your Honor, I'm coming from
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   Washington, DC.
22
                        I'm coming from Nashville, Tennessee.
            MR. CLASE:
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            THE COURT:
                        Okay. Well, welcome to Sherman.
   assume it's your first time here.
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25
            MS. LOWRY: It is. It's a beautiful courthouse.
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   Happy to be here.
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            THE COURT:
                        Yeah.
                               It's the oldest courthouse
   being used in the Fifth Circuit, so -- opened in 1907.
 3
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            Well, here's my thoughts, is I have a number of
   questions, and so we'll start with the Plaintiffs, if you
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   want to take the podium. And I thought I'd ask my
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   questions that I have, and then you can say whatever else
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   you want to say, so -- and I'll do that for both sides.
            MR. KRUCKENBERG: Yes, your Honor.
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            THE COURT:
                        So are you doing slides or something,
11
   or no?
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            MR. KRUCKENBERG: No, your Honor. I just have my
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   notes on my laptop.
            THE COURT: No, that's fine.
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            So let me start off and ask. You don't explicitly
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   say you're asking for a nationwide injunction and -- but
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   the Government, I think, characterizes that's what you're
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           And so are you asking for a nationwide injunction
   asking.
   in terms of what the relief is, or is it just for the
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   parties before the Court?
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            MR. KRUCKENBERG: Your Honor, we are asking -- I
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   think there are sort of two ways to look at it, but we're
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   really only asking for preliminary relief for the parties.
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   And when we say that, we mean the named Plaintiffs and also
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   the associational members of NFIB.
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There is -- you know, obviously, if we're looking
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   at eventual relief or ultimate relief, there are issues
   about the Administrative Procedure Act and vacatur and
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 4
   things like that.
            But I think for simplicity's sake, we can just say
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   for the preliminary injunction the only request we're
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 7
   making is with respect to the Plaintiffs.
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            THE COURT: Okay. I just wanted to clear it up.
   I wasn't sure, so --
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            MR. KRUCKENBERG:
                               Yes.
11
                       Okay. And then, of course, we've had
            THE COURT:
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   two District Judges, you know, address this in the country
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   so far.
           Why do you think that the Firestone-Yellen case is
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   wrong, and does that change anything in your argument,
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   what -- what's happened there?
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            MR. KRUCKENBERG:
                              Yes, your Honor. So there's --
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   in my mind, there's a few issues with the District of
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   Oregon case, the Firestone case. And I think probably the
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   most obvious issue is that, you know, A, there are
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   different claims at issue. And I think one of the
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   distinguishing factors there is that the District Court
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   said that there was no showing of injury.
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            And while that may have been acceptable under
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   Ninth Circuit precedent, I don't think that kind of holding
25
   could possibly be valid here under binding Fifth Circuit
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precedent.

One of the things the District Court in *Firestone* said was -- and this is on page 26 of the opinion -- quote, Plaintiffs offer no evidence, only speculation of injury.

And there the Court was talking about compliance costs and potential constitutional injuries, and I don't think there's any kind of dispute here that the Plaintiffs must comply with the Corporate Transparency Act, the Plaintiffs here.

There are compliance costs associated. Those have been calculated by FinCEN. And Fifth Circuit is very clear that compliance costs on administrative regulation, that can constitute irreparable injury if the underlying regulation is unlawful. So I don't think that issue is in play here in the same way.

On the merits, I think one of the critical errors -- just talking about enumerated powers and the First Amendment, the Court -- with respect to the First Amendment, the Court didn't cite to the Americans for Prosperity case at all.

And one of the issues there was that the District Court in *Firestone* concluded that, again, there was no evidence of chill or that anyone had refrained from expressive conduct because of the fear of the CTA, but that was dealt with in the *AFP* decision. The Court said we

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don't have to have evidence like that in exactly this concept -- context.
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So I think that was an error that the District Court made in *Firestone*.

And on the commerce issue, I think the Court there essentially made the mistake that the United States has encouraged this Court to make, and that is to equate registry of a business entity with the act of commerce. And those are not the same thing, and I think the proof is pretty obvious. A corporate entity can be forced to register even if they have no economic activity, even if they have no assets, even if they have no activities whatsoever.

And to say that that is commerce per se I think is in error. Those are just not the same things. They're -- instead, they're -- I think it is up to the United States to demonstrate a clear connection, which is absent.

THE COURT: And I have a bunch of these general questions, and then we'll go into each of the topics.

But why exactly is the statute unconstitutional as applied to MSLP, which is a political organization that is not exempt under the CTA because it's not considered a political organization under the Tax Code?

MR. KRUCKENBERG: Well, I think that is a clear example of the inartful drafting of the Corporate

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Transparency Act, and that's why there's a First-Amendment problem.
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Yes, some corporations will not have these kinds of interests. But clearly, a political party, like MSLP, can and does, and they still have to register. And it's not because of some realistic concern that MSLP is uniquely involved in money-laundering activity but just, by virtue of sort of the quirk in the IRS regulations, they have to register. They don't have an active exemption under 501(c). They're not actively recognized as a political organization.

But that doesn't mean they're a commercial entity. That just means that they don't have this distinct tax status and they have to register here. And if they have to register, I don't think there is any doubt under AFP versus Becerra that they have to disclose information that has First-Amendment protections.

So the question is: Is the justification given by the Government under the Corporate Transparency Act sufficient to force a political party like MSLP to disclose their donors, their control persons, and put it on a federal registry?

And, I mean, these are the same interests at issue in AFP. And if there the integrity of political donations was not enough, I -- I fail to see how this very abstract

sense of money laundering in general is sufficient to say we can invade this interest of a political organization.

But I also think even if we're talking about the other Plaintiffs, the ones that are not directly involved in political advocacy, they also have First-Amendment interests that I don't think we can discount or ignore, because -- I mean, one of the things that we saw is that several of the Plaintiffs engaged in direct corporate advocacy.

And we actually have an issue where not everyone associated with those corporate entities wants to associate with that advocacy, as is their right, and -- and one of DataComm's beneficial owners says, "I don't want to be associated with that. I don't want to be disclosed for fear of being associated with your political message." And that is exactly the kind of First-Amendment interest we're normally talking about in this context.

THE COURT: Now, your brief suggests that the CTA is unconstitutional as applied because the five Plaintiff companies don't have substantial assets and don't engage in interstate commerce.

But the Government responded that nothing in the CTA narrows the application to the companies that have substantial ties to interstate commerce. What would be your response to that?

MR. KRUCKENBERG: That's essentially saying some companies do engage in commerce; therefore, we can regulate anything as long as some participants eventually engage in business.

And essentially what they're saying is, well, lots of businesses are in business. It's good enough. But that -- I think the Supreme Court has been very clear with us. You have to have some principle.

And the concern here is there is no limiting principle on what is the difference between a business entity that has no interstate activities, no economic activities, and interstate commerce in general.

And I think when we're considering the analysis, it's very helpful to look at the case out of Alabama, and I think the District Court made a very cogent observation there. If we just look at the statute, the triggering event for federal jurisdiction is the filing of a document with a state registrar. That's it. That is the triggering event.

And the Government's entire theory is lots of people who file documents with state registrars eventually end up in interstate commerce. But that's the same kind of reasoning that everybody has to buy health insurance as a matter of interstate commerce because they eventually will be participants in the market. And the Court in NFIB said

that that is not sufficient.

THE COURT: Why isn't MSLP and Mustardseed basically like the farmer in the *Wickard* case or the marijuana growers in *Raich* -- I'm not sure I'm pronouncing that right -- but *Gonzales versus Raich*.

MR. KRUCKENBERG: Right.

And the distinction there is the Court in Raich said we have to distinguish between economic classes of activity and noneconomic classes of activity. And if we have a comprehensive regulatory regime over economic classes of activity, then we can reach these edge cases, these individual Plaintiffs or entities that don't have interstate activity.

In the illicit marijuana market, that makes a lot of sense. There is a federal prohibition on marijuana.

Growing marijuana for personal use affects that commercial market. That makes sense.

Here, there is no comprehensive federal regulatory regime for corporate registry. Quite the opposite. There has never been one in the nation's history.

There is no federal regulatory regime that is in existence that depends on capturing in these kinds of edge cases. Instead, we are creating a brand-new one that's not yet taken effect. And so the whole idea in *Raich* was if we can't capture this type of activity, the existing laws

won't work. 1 2 This is a new regime that it claims to solve a problem that goes unaddressed and says to be able to work, 3 4 we have to bring in everything, even if it's economic or And that's just not consistent, I think, with what 5 the Court was saying in Gonzales and Raich. 6 7 THE COURT: Now, you agree that the fact the 8 Supreme Court has acknowledged that corporate formation is generally an issue left to the states doesn't foreclose the 10 possibility of Congress regulating what companies do. 11 agree with that, don't you? 12 MR. KRUCKENBERG: Absolutely. 13 THE COURT: And so why is this not just an extension of that? 14 15 MR. KRUCKENBERG: Well, I think the Court has been 16 very clear in the corporate sphere throughout its history

MR. KRUCKENBERG: Well, I think the Court has been very clear in the corporate sphere throughout its history with what the dividing line is and some of the court's earlier cases, particularly in the 1930s and '40s where they're dealing with the first efforts to nationalize corporate regulation with the Securities Exchange Act. And the Court said, look, what makes this different, what makes this a federal issue is the interstate aspect of corporate transactions.

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And it's not an accident that the Securities and Exchange Act -- each offense under the Securities and

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Exchange Act has an element of interstate commerce that
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   must be proven by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
   Federal jurisdiction is -- I mean, we're used to this.
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   It's common. Wire fraud, money-laundering statutes, all of
   the substantive offenses have an interstate element.
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   suddenly the federal government has said we don't need that
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   anymore for the Corporate Transparency Act.
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            And as the court recognized in Alabama, that's the
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   problem. It's such a simple fix for the Government.
   could say as long as these entities are engaged in
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   interstate commerce.
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            That's what they should have done and we could
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   solve that problem very easily, but they didn't.
   we've seen with the Plaintiffs, because they didn't, they
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   claim that it attaches to everybody, no matter what, and
    there is no limit on the federal jurisdiction.
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                        So you believe that would be the most
            THE COURT:
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   tenable ground for Congress to have done that, is what you
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   just indicated?
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            MR. KRUCKENBERG:
                              I think that would have been a
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   very simple legal solution. I think the Court has been
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   very clear that that -- that's essentially all Congress has
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   to do. But it's very important that they didn't and it's,
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   I think, very telling that they didn't. And so we can
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   maybe envision a constitutional statute, but it doesn't
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save the CTA.

THE COURT: Now, why is there insufficient nexus for Congress to legislate pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause? Because doesn't the law -- the law imposes a very low bar for Congress to use the Necessary and Proper Clause. Why isn't that met here?

MR. KRUCKENBERG: So, I think this is where we're seeing the slippage of language. And what I mean by that is in the United States' briefing they use phrases like "this information is useful," "this information would benefit the federal government."

Sure. That's not necessary and proper, and that is a distinct kind of an idea.

And the Supreme Court in NFIB, when they were talking about both the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause -- and they rejected both justifications for the Affordable Care Act -- the Court was very clear in saying that there is a limit. And it goes to the class of activity, economic/noneconomic.

And it was insufficient in that case for the Government to say everybody will eventually participate in the insurance market. That is close enough to commercial activity that under the Necessary and Proper Clause, we can get there.

And I think a similar kind of argument is being

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made here.
           Yes, these entities are not engaged in
business. Yes, not every entity that has to register is
commercial. But some of them are, and so that gets us
close enough.
        And that is not the appropriate constitutional
analysis. You have to look at what the law actually does
and whether or not that is a direct connection.
        THE COURT: So let me turn -- I have some
questions regarding -- more specific on the Commerce
Clause.
        In listening to the Yellen -- the oral argument
before the Eleventh Circuit, the term that kept coming up
multiple times is the comment "There's nothing more
economic than companies."
        So -- that seems true, so why doesn't the Commerce
Clause not authorize passage of the CTA based on some of
the arguments made there at the Eleventh Circuit?
        MR. KRUCKENBERG:
                          I dispute the premise.
                                                  I don't
think there's anything economic about a company, and I
think that is a -- that's an erroneous kind of a shorthand
reasoning. That's where we're --
                    So, is that because it doesn't deal --
        THE COURT:
in your mind, it doesn't deal with companies or the act of
registration is --
        MR. KRUCKENBERG: Either one. But certainly not
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the act of registration, because, again, there doesn't even
have to be a company that does anything.
                                         It just has to
register before the CTA is implicated.
        But as we've seen with MSLP, that is a company,
that is a business entity or a corporate entity.
a business, though.
                    It doesn't engage in commerce, and
it's not a for-profit venture. It is a political
organization that spins on political matters. That's it.
        And there are lots of instances.
                                          There are --
every nonprofit is a company.
                               There are so many LLPs,
LLCs, corporations, all these entities. They exist for
lots of different reasons.
        Business is a common one, but it's not the only
     And it is not true to say that every business or
every entity -- every corporate entity is engaged in
business or will one day engage in business.
demonstrably false.
        THE COURT:
                    So I guess I'm trying to understand
the idea of CTA. Does it regulate, you know, entity
formation at all under state law, and does it subtract or
add anything to the registration process in terms of the
CTA?
        I understand this is typically a state function,
but in terms of Congress trying to pass laws that involve
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interstate commerce, why is that not the case? Because --

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I guess could it be more accurate to say the CTA is regulating companies because they're the ones who engage in interstate commerce, financial crimes, which has been what the goal of the CTA was to deal with?
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MR. KRUCKENBERG: Well, existing rules capture the problem that the Government is claiming they need to get to because -- I mean, think about money laundering. It's clearly federally illegal already, and there's an interstate element to that.

So the idea that we need the CTA to get at something, well, what is it that you need to get at? I think that's a suggestion. They say we need to get to something that's less interstate.

But if I'm looking at just as a function of law what this does, probably the easiest example is MSLP.

There are Mississippi statutes -- and we've cited in the Complaint and in the briefing -- that say things like you cannot force a political entity like this to disclose their members. There's -- there are state protections built in as a part of the registration process for a business entity like MSLP.

This preempts those, or claims to. And this says notwithstanding those protections, notwithstanding that anonymity that you're normally guaranteed under state law, we're making you tell us anyway and register with FinCEN.

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This is a new activity that is preempting contrary state
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   law in a number of jurisdictions.
            And so that, I think, is really where the concern
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   comes up, because it's changing the entire game.
   changing the way that corporations have identified -- or
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   have registered, have disclosed information to the public,
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   and this is completely new.
            THE COURT: Well, isn't the potential -- or isn't
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   that the potential to engage in kind of preexisting illegal
   market sufficient under the Gonzales/Raich case?
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            MR. KRUCKENBERG: Sure. And that's why -- that's
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   why money laundering can be prosecuted.
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            But, again, we're sort of -- if I can think of an
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   analogy, it's almost like the Government is saying lots of
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   cars use roads; so, therefore, anybody who uses a road is a
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   car.
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            And that is not -- that's not a logically
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   consistent kind of an argument, but that's what they're
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            They're saying, well, lots of businesses engage in
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   commerce and some businesses engage in money laundering;
21
   therefore, we must regulate every entity. And that's
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   clearly just not the case.
23
            And I think also what proves the lie in the
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reasoning is the list of exemptions. So if this is really

about money laundering -- I mean, we can debate why or why

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   not they think the existing remedies are inadequate, but
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   they also exempted most of the likely culprits from the
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   CTA.
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            And, yes, some are registered with the SEC or
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   other regulators, but some are not. I mean, an entity that
   has $5 million in revenue and 20 employees is exempt just
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   because. And I don't think that is logically consistent
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   with their idea of it's really about money laundering.
            THE COURT: Now, what's your response -- you know,
   the Government takes position of using channels of
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   interstate commerce and that the reporting companies use
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   the phones, Internet, other things that are in commerce.
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   What's your response to that in terms of why it's not
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   authorized by the CTA because they use these channels of
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   commerce?
            MR. KRUCKENBERG: Well, your Honor, if that was
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   the case, then we have officially crossed the line that the
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   limits on federal jurisdiction are truly meaningless.
   doubt there's a human being alive who has not --
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            THE COURT: So, in your view, under that theory
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   every -- there would be nothing that couldn't be regulated,
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   then?
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            MR. KRUCKENBERG:
                              Every person in the United
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   States has used the instrumentalities or channels of
25
   interstate commerce at some point in their life. I used a
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number of them this morning.

If that is sufficient, just because a business entity will some day predictably use the channels of interstate commerce -- because, again, it's not an element of the registration statute -- then there is absolutely no limit.

I'll also point out that the United States has conceded in other litigation, the Alabama case particularly, that the filing of a document, the triggering event for federal jurisdiction -- they've said, well, okay, we concede that that is not the use of the channels of interstate commerce sufficient to justify the act, which I think is a wise concession because that comes from the NFIB case, again, which is you can't tell people they have to do something that then triggers a federal obligation.

THE COURT: Now, this case is different than the Morrison case, is it not? That -- and regulating necessary commercial potential conduct is not a noneconomic activity like gender-motivated crimes that was in the Morrison case. Do you agree with that?

MR. KRUCKENBERG: Yes, your Honor. And I think if we're -- and Morrison and Lopez, I think, very clearly present the other side of this, that there is a line where we look at the actual statute and the essential purpose of the statute.

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And, yes, gender-motivated crime, that is not
commercial activity, the same as incorporating a nonprofit
political party is not commercial activity.
        THE COURT: And do you acknowledge that a
jurisdictional hook is not necessary for Congress to
legislate pursuant to the Commerce Clause?
        MR. KRUCKENBERG: I do.
                                 It's not always
necessary.
        But, again, I think that's where we're in the very
limited Raich versus Gonzales universe where we have a
legitimate federal regulatory framework that does have a
jurisdictional hook.
        And what the Court says is in those cases we can
still encompass certain local activity within the
framework. But that is, I think, very different than
saying we never have to have a jurisdictional hook and we
can regulate wholly local activity anyway. Those are -- I
think those are very sort of subtly different ideas.
that, frankly, is what the Government is trying to raise
here, they're trying to defend the CTA based on.
        THE COURT: So what is the basis for your
conclusion that CTA is not part of an integrated statutory
scheme?
        MR. KRUCKENBERG: So the question is what
statutory scheme and what comprehensive regulatory
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framework?
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            So if we're saying, well, the CTA, which does not
   yet exist, that's -- I mean, we're assuming our conclusion,
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 4
   right?
            And the way I read Raich is what the Court is
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   really talking about is we have to have a legitimate
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 7
   regulatory framework and the local coverage has to be,
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   quote, essential to that larger framework.
            THE COURT: But wouldn't financial crimes -- they
   would be economic activities, wouldn't they?
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            MR. KRUCKENBERG:
                              So you -- yes, you can always --
12
   you can always take it out to this level of abstraction
13
   where we're saying, well, it's financial crimes in general.
   But that's not --
14
15
            THE COURT: But Congress already has preexisting
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   regulatory schemes in place to target that, right?
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            MR. KRUCKENBERG: Sure. And those are
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   constitutional because they're different. Because, like I
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   said, if we look at money laundering, there is a
20
   jurisdictional element. If there are tax-reporting
21
   obligations, those typically arise from financial
22
   institutions, not -- under a completely different
23
   regulatory regime.
24
            And this -- I mean, the framers of --
25
            THE COURT:
                        Isn't that one of the goals of the
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CTA, is -- a scheme that's already there, they're still
 1
 2
   trying to ferret out any kind of nefarious motive by other
   companies, and isn't that one of the goals?
 3
 4
            MR. KRUCKENBERG:
                              Yes, and that's the problem.
            So we have an existing money-laundering reporting
 5
   framework, the Bank Secrecy Act, that entire framework,
 6
 7
   which applies almost exclusively to outward-facing monetary
   transactions or interstate activities. There is a lot of
 8
   reporting obligations there. That's the existing
 9
10
    framework.
11
            What Congress said is we don't think that's good
12
   enough because we don't like the existing framework, so
13
   we're going to come up with a new framework, a new registry
   obligation to do something different. It's not essential
14
15
   to the existing scheme; it's a new scheme.
            And if we're reading Raich to say we can do
16
   anything federally as long as it serves a useful function,
17
18
   then, again, we've taken whatever limits exist and we've
19
   destroyed them. I mean, there's no limiting principle to
20
   say, like, well, yeah, of course, the Government thinks
21
   this is useful.
                     That's why they passed it. Doesn't mean
22
   it's constitutional.
23
            THE COURT: And Congress doesn't actually have to
24
   identify the regulatory scheme in the CTA, does it?
25
            MR. KRUCKENBERG: I don't think they do. But,
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again, we have to look at what is it.

And if we look in context and we look particularly at what the CTA says and it claims to be amending part of the Bank Secrecy Act, then I think it best -- if it's part of the regulatory scheme, we have to place it within the Bank Secrecy Act.

And then we have to say does this -- is this an essential component of the success of the existing Bank Secrecy Act, or is this something different? And I think everything indicates this is something very different.

Nothing like this has ever been passed before.

THE COURT: And to make sure I understand, what is the -- what is -- in your view, what does the CTA regulate?

MR. KRUCKENBERG: The CTA regulates any person once they file a state incorporation document. And I say "incorporation," but partnership agreement, whatever.

As soon as they register with a state entity, the CTA comes in and it says you must create and produce records and file them with us on our dates and if you do not, there is a presumption of criminal liability.

So every Plaintiff here has been directed to comply before the end of the year. If they don't file anything, it is a federal felony. They have been informed of their obligation, and they decided not to.

And the only triggering event, the only thing that

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they have done to incur that obligation is registering --
1
 2
   is preexisting registration with their state entities. All
   the entities filed their registration statements before the
 3
 4
   CTA even took effect. It's not like they have even done
 5
   anything since the act was passed. Instead, they have just
   been registered under state law.
 6
 7
            THE COURT: So to make sure -- I'm still trying to
 8
   make sure I understand. So, in your mind, the CTA just
   regulates -- it's -- you don't view it as regulating
 9
10
   registration?
11
            MR. KRUCKENBERG: No. And I think if we look at
12
   the specific requirements -- so registration under state
13
   law -- and let me just use an example from one of the
14
   clients.
15
            If I think of Texas Top Cop Shop, they registered
16
   in Texas as a corporation. They had to identify a
17
   registered representative.
                               That's it. They don't have to
18
   identify the officers, the directors, the shareholders,
19
   anything like that.
20
            Now, because of the CTA, they have to identify the
21
   beneficial owners. That, yes, includes the actual owner,
22
   the 25 percent or more. That includes people with
23
   substantial control, formally or informally.
                                                  That includes
24
   a lot of other entities that do not have to be disclosed,
25
   and they have to create those records.
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They have to chase down the ownership interests, the control -- the informal control interests, and then they have to identify those and create those records, file those records, have photocopies of identification of each individual identified, have their current address, their date of birth. And they have to file it all with FinCEN before the end of the year, and every Plaintiff has to do that. And according to FinCEN, at least 32 million other small businesses nationwide, existing ones, have to do all of those activities before the end of the year and then probably 5 million new ones each additional year thereafter. So this is not just registry; this is an ongoing reporting requirement. You have an ongoing obligation to update information that changes. And this is very invasive information. I mean,

And this is very invasive information. I mean, this is your photocopy of your driver's license, your birthday.

THE COURT: Now switching gears. Aside from Yellen, what is your best case for the proposition that Congress cannot invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause to assist in collecting taxes?

MR. KRUCKENBERG: Your Honor, that, again, is NFIB versus Sebelius. And I think the Court there -- when we

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talked about the taxing and spending power, laying and
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   assessing taxes, we have to create revenue.
                                                  The Court was
           So we have to have some kind of revenue generation.
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 4
            THE COURT: But isn't that case very different?
                                                               Ι
 5
   mean, that dealt with a case of requiring someone to
   purchase health care, which is very different than
 6
 7
   requiring disclosure, who's in charge of a company or owns
 8
   a company.
            MR. KRUCKENBERG:
                              Right.
            So the tax premise that the Court rejected in NFIB
10
11
   was we can buy -- we can make people buy health care or
12
   impose a tax penalty upon them if they choose not to.
13
   That's the mechanism, right?
            And so the Government said there, well, we would
14
15
   be raising revenue by taxing them for not participating.
16
   That's a taxing power.
17
            The Court rejected it, and they said that is too
18
   attenuated a revenue-generating measure under the taxing
19
   power and the Necessary and Proper Clause. It's just too
20
   attenuated from revenue generation.
21
            Here, where's the revenue coming from? It's not
22
   from the CTA; it's through this theoretical enforcement.
23
   They are saying once we have all this information about all
24
   these companies, we might be able to catch cheating and
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that's maybe gonna raise revenue.

That's -- I mean, in the Affordable Care Act 1 situation, we at least knew who was gonna have to pay taxes 2 and we knew what they were going to have to pay. And here, 3 4 it's just this theoretical possibility, well, we're certainly going to catch something in our massive database 5 of information just to, sort of, hunt around for the hope 6 7 I mean, that's very different, and I think of crime. 8 that's a very concerning kind of a position to take from the Government. I mean, that's why we have the 10 Fourth-Amendment argument. 11 THE COURT: Switching gears again. The CTA and 12 the Government reference that the U.S. is out of step with 13 international standards for corporate disclosures. Are you aware of what that standard is? 14 15 MR. KRUCKENBERG: Your Honor, there -- this has 16 been a debate for a long time. And as a matter of state 17 law and as a matter of state policy, every state has taken 18 the view that anonymity in corporate affairs or anonymity 19 in corporate ownership is a worthwhile interest. And there 20 are lots of legitimate business reasons for anonymity and 21 also protected interests, like First-Amendment 22 The states have all recognized that. associations. 23 Some federal policy makers disagree and other 24 countries disagree, but that really has nothing to say 25 about what our Constitution says is appropriate.

And, frankly, if the federal government wants to change the standards, they could have done so in a way that at least didn't have the kind of commerce problems. But then, of course, we still have First- and Fourth-Amendment concerns.

And so I guess with due respect to my European colleagues, they don't have the same constitutional protections. And that's why we're out of step, because we actually protect different kinds of liberties.

THE COURT: Now, I know you rely upon Bond and -how is that applicable to this case? Because it seems like
the facts of Bond are just so distinguishable from what we
have here.

MR. KRUCKENBERG: I think *Bond* is useful in a --constitutional avoidance in a statutory interpretation analysis.

And, essentially, the argument here is if we take the United States at its word -- and this really is justified under the foreign affairs power -- then there's nothing really concerning going on.

And I think what Justice Scalia's concurrence in Bond really got at is that would upset -- if we're reading these kinds of powers to say anything is international because we say it is, then that upsets normal understanding of jurisdiction, normal understanding of federalism, and

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   we're not willing to risk it as a Court. I mean, that's
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   what the Court said. We're just not gonna go there if
   there's any plausible interpretive off-ramp.
 3
 4
            I don't think we have to get there because there
   is no international element here.
 5
                                       The only international
   element --
 6
 7
            THE COURT: But don't you -- I mean, you agree
 8
   that it's not purely a domestic statute. Foreign companies
   also have to comply, correct?
 9
10
            MR. KRUCKENBERG: Sure. But that doesn't mean any
11
   law that has some international application is justified
12
   under the foreign affairs doctrine. I mean, the foreign
13
   affairs doctrine is about truly national decisions
   interacting with international actors.
14
15
            And the rationale for the foreign affairs
   doctrine -- I mean, it's implied from the Constitution.
16
   And the idea is that, well, we have to have some national
17
18
   consensus; otherwise, individual actors might risk
19
   political relationships with foreign countries.
20
            That, obviously, is very different from here
21
   where, yes, some of the 32 million businesses might have
22
   international contact, maybe, but maybe not.
23
          That's merely an assumption.
24
            THE COURT: But isn't that a national security
25
   concern, that you have foreign companies that you're
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1 figuring out whether they're -- are they doing terrorism 2 financing, things like that? MR. KRUCKENBERG: 3 Sure. And that's why money 4 laundering and international financing of terrorism and material support for terrorism are all prohibited, and 5 they're all legitimately prohibited under foreign affairs 6 7 powers when they have an international element. 8 But it's not enough to just say that those are 9 important concerns; therefore, anything that could possibly serve them must also be valid. 10 11 THE COURT: And then other than Bond, what's your 12 best case for the proposition that Congress cannot 13 legislate in this arena with its foreign affairs and 14 necessary and proper power? Do you have another case other than Bond? 15 Well, your Honor, if we go to 16 MR. KRUCKENBERG: any of -- and so, first of all, I would just rely on the 17 18 briefing. I don't have it in front of me. But if we look at any of the foreign affairs doctrine cases -- so Bond 19 20 talks -- and, obviously, Bond was not resolved on constitutional grounds, but Bond, as I said, was about 21 22 constitutional avoidance. 23

But if we look at the origins of the doctrine, every time it's invoked it's about not binding the United States or not allowing a state to change our relationship

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with our foreign adversaries or some sort of international
activity. And that is a very, very different kind of a
relationship.
        And if we're implying this power, it has to be
actually and directly related in some way to international
affairs.
        THE COURT:
                    So those are the questions I had for
you.
        Now, I -- if you have other things you want to
talk about, you certainly can or we can switch over to the
Government and -- and to be candid, I mean, we can talk
about constitutional claims, but if I get to -- if you
don't win on the things I've already asked about, then I
don't think the constitutional claims are strong.
think your better arguments are the other claims, so that's
the reason why I really don't feel -- that's why I'm not
asking any questions about -- generally about going
specifically to your constitutional claims.
        But you're welcome to say anything you want to say
about those. I'm just -- I'm trying to be as open as
possible about -- I think your -- if you win this case, at
least at this preliminary stage, it's going to be on these
other matters, probably not the constitutional claims,
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But that doesn't mean that -- you know, if you

based on my looking at everything.

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lose on the first part, doesn't mean -- I'll be forced at
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 2
   the second so --
            MR. KRUCKENBERG: Well, and, your Honor, I --
 3
 4
   obviously, I appreciate -- I appreciate your frankness with
   this. But I do want to talk about the First-Amendment
 5
   claim because I think it is easy to overlook in the context
 6
 7
   of everything that's happening.
 8
            And as I said at the outset, the Firestone opinion
 9
   from Oregon I think really does a disservice to the
   First-Amendment issue, and part of that was because those
10
11
   Plaintiffs had different claims and they had different
12
   interests.
13
            But here, we have unequivocal, expressive conduct
   that is within the scope of the statute.
14
                                              There's --
15
   there -- the disclosure requirements for all of the
16
   Plaintiffs, not just MSLP, implicate expressive conduct.
   But, obviously, MSLP is the most extreme example.
17
18
   these are the inner workings of a state political party,
19
   about who funds them, about who's making decisions about
20
   how to spend money, political money for political purposes.
21
   That is core expressive activity. And the CTA is forcing
22
   them to disclose that information to the Secretary of
23
   Treasury for his review for crime -- criminal investigative
24
   purposes.
25
            That is more invasive than the regime in AFP
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I mean, that was a situation where
 1
   versus Becerra.
 2
   donors -- or nonprofits had to say who gave them donations
 3
   in a registry to the state secretary, Becerra, and those
 4
   were nonpublic. Those could not be -- it was the same
           It was to check with compliance. And the Court
 5
   said that failed exacting scrutiny.
 6
 7
            And I don't see any principled way to distinguish
 8
   what's happening in AFP versus Becerra versus what's
   happening here with the CTA to the Libertarian Party of
10
   Mississippi. I don't think there's even a good argument
11
    that those are distinguishable. And that raises a
12
   constitutional problem, and particularly in a preliminary
13
   injunction context.
14
            And, again, Becerra said this. We don't have to
15
   say -- we don't to have actual evidence that people are
16
   chilled from their exercise of free speech or association.
17
   It's enough that their behavior is arguably proscribed by
18
                  That creates a presumption of a
   the statute.
19
   First-Amendment chill, and that is enough for preliminary
20
   injunction.
21
            And so I would just urge this Court to consider
22
   that issue because I think that is -- it's one that the
23
   United States has not argued very much but is one that I
24
   think the Supreme Court has been very clear on.
25
            THE COURT:
                        Thank you.
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MR. KRUCKENBERG: And, your Honor, just to finish up, I do want to touch very briefly on the Fourth-Amendment issue.

And I know we've talked about this a little bit, but even if we're looking at this under *Patel* and under the sort of lesser reasonable -- or the lesser test we might apply for a subpoena, even then this fails.

And one thing that I would point out that we've argued in the briefing is that our clients actually have reasonable expectations of privacy in the information at issue. I mean, the CTA says this information is private, which is kind of a tell. But it's also -- again, it implicates First-Amendment interests in some cases, I mean, with the MSLP.

If there's a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court has said, in *Carpenter*, that this

Schultz (phonetic) analysis that the Government relies on, that doesn't even apply. You have to have a warrant if there's a reasonable expectation of privacy. Not even the third-party doctrine applies there.

But even if we don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy, even if we reject that, under the *Oklahoma*Press standard that we usually use for subpoenas, as the Court made clear in the Patel case, you have to at least have an option of precompliance challenge.

1 So think about IRS subpoenas. This is where it 2 comes up all the time. This is similar kinds of If the IRS subpoenas you because they suspect 3 information. 4 you of tax fraud, you have to produce information. The IRS 5 still has to subpoena you, and you can go to Federal Court and challenge the subpoena and that is your precompliance 6 7 effort to challenge the inquiry. 8 Here, there's nothing. There is a presumption of 9 disclosure of all information, no matter what, for every person, for all 32 million-plus existing entities, must be 10 11 filed for the explicit purpose of criminal investigation, 12 and there is no opportunity for review from a neutral 13 party. That is too far. 14 And, your Honor, I'm more than happy to answer any 15 other questions but, otherwise, we would urge this Court to 16 preliminarily enjoin the statute. 17 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I appreciate it. 18 Thank you. MR. KRUCKENBERG: 19 MS. LOWRY: Good morning, your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Good morning. 21 Let me start off and ask you, your response argues 22 that the Plaintiffs' delay in seeking relief weighs against 23 the idea that they suffer any kind of irreparable injury. 24 But the FinCEN has not been accepting beneficial ownership 25 reports long before the Plaintiffs actually filed the suit.

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So what about that?
 1
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            MS. LOWRY:
                        I think there are three relevant dates
   that we can use to measure Plaintiffs' delay against.
 3
 4
            First, there is the passage of the CTA in 2021.
            Second is the finalizing of the final rule for the
 5
   Beneficial Ownership Interest reporting requirement at the
 6
 7
   end of 2022.
            And then you see the opening of the -- of FinCEN
 8
 9
   saying we'll now take those Beneficial Ownership Interest
   filings starting at the beginning of this year.
10
11
            Regardless of which date you use, the Plaintiffs
12
   in this case either waited several months or several years
13
   to initiate this lawsuit. And if delay in seeking a
14
   preliminary injunction is going to mean anything, those six
15
   months, over a year, back to two years of delay are going
   to weigh against the finding of irreparable harm.
16
17
                        Now, at the same time, you know, you
            THE COURT:
   say that there's plenty of time to render a meaningful
18
19
   decision on the merits. So on the one hand, you say they
20
   waited too long, but on the other hand, you say they didn't
21
   wait long enough for a preliminary injunction to be
22
   warranted.
               Which is it?
23
            MS. LOWRY:
                        I think that is just the nature of the
24
   inquiry for irreparable harm, that you need this -- the
25
   urgent need and that you did not delay in seeking it.
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1
   goes to whether the Plaintiffs have created the urgency of
 2
   the situation. Had they filed at any of these earlier
   times, that urgency wouldn't exist.
 3
 4
            I would concede, though, your Honor, we're now
                   That argument was made several months ago
 5
   into October.
   when the briefing was filed. I would take that off the
 6
 7
   table at this point. We're, obviously, now in a shorter
   time frame.
 8
                               Thank you.
            THE COURT:
                        Okay.
10
            Now, do you disagree that the costs Plaintiffs
11
   will incur by complying constitutes irreparable harm?
12
            MS. LOWRY: I do, your Honor, at least as
13
   supported by the evidence attached to the briefing.
14
            While compliance costs can be competent evidence
15
   of irreparable harm, here the Plaintiffs haven't specified
   what those compliance costs are. And FinCEN's compliance
16
17
   cost estimates were, at least the large numbers that
18
   Plaintiffs cite, in the aggregate.
19
            As to the individual Plaintiffs and parties, I
20
   believe the estimate was as low as something like $85.
21
   That would be a de minimis compliance cost. Because the
22
   Plaintiffs haven't actually supported what those costs are
23
   going to be, I think that shows that they haven't
24
   demonstrated that those costs would be more than
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de minimis.

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1
            THE COURT:
                        Well, how are compliance costs
 2
   de minimis?
 3
                        I believe this was the bump stocks
            MS. LOWRY:
 4
   case in front of Judge O'Connor, a finding that $200 or
 5
   less in compliance costs are de minimis, so that there is
   some -- it's not a single dollar of compliance cost is
 6
 7
   sufficient to demonstrate irreparable harm. There actually
   has to be a more than de minimis amount.
 8
 9
            I think the Courts come down somewhere in the 100
10
   to $200 range. We just don't have evidence that the
11
   compliance costs here are going to exceed that.
12
            THE COURT: And then the Yellen case, isn't that
13
   totally different because you didn't have -- you had
14
   unverified complaint and there were no declarations like we
15
   have here?
16
            MS. LOWRY:
                        Yes.
                               That is a distinguishing feature
                That is why the evidence was not competent in
17
   of Yellen.
   that case and not sufficient in that case.
18
19
            Ours is -- rather than having, you know,
20
   unverified and no evidence whatsoever -- is just
21
   conclusory.
22
                        And then what is your response to the
            THE COURT:
23
   Plaintiffs' argument that the Fifth Circuit case, Rest. Law
24
    Center versus DOL, forecloses the argument that Plaintiffs
25
   have not shown irreparable harm through their declarations
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that demonstrate their compliance costs?
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 2
            MS. LOWRY:
                        I don't know the specific -- how I
   would specifically distinguish that case, only to say that
 3
 4
   the allegations of compliance costs here are entirely
   conclusory. There are no specifics as to what those
 5
   compliance costs are going to be.
 6
 7
            When we look, for example, at Mustardseed, we have
 8
   what appears to be a relatively small operation, selling
           I don't understand the complication with their
 9
   milk.
10
   filing that would justify more than de minimis compliance
11
   costs.
12
            THE COURT:
                        And then don't the penalty provisions
13
   of the CTA suggest Congress isn't regulating companies as
   much as regulating individuals?
14
                        The criminal penalties -- whether that
15
            MS. LOWRY:
16
   shows regulation at the individual level or the corporate
17
            Is that the question?
   level?
18
            THE COURT:
                        Yes.
                        Yeah, I think that the criminal
19
            MS. LOWRY:
20
   penalties most relevant here are as applicable to -- under
21
   the Anti-Money Laundering Act. That is the regulatory
22
   scheme that we should be looking at.
23
            And individuals can be prosecuted for their
24
   participation through companies and activities that they
25
   engage in through companies in addition to, you know, the
```

1 corporate forums. 2 THE COURT: Okay. Now, switching to the Commerce 3 Clause, you seem to argue that CTA regulates either 4 companies as instrumentalities of commerce or future possible conduct. What exactly is the activity the CTA 5 regulates, and where in the statute can you draw that from? 6 7 MS. LOWRY: I believe that the conduct that the 8 CTA regulates is the anonymous existence and operation of corporations. 10 And here we need to separate the "who" from the 11 "what." When you look at -- your Honor addressed, like, 12 the Gonzales cases, guns in school zones or violence 13 against women. Those laws applied to everyone, right? That was the "who." When the Court did the Commerce Clause 14 15 analysis, it looked at the "what," guns in school zones, 16 violence against women. 17 Here, the "who" isn't everyone. It's not every 18 person in the United States. It's defined through the 19 filing with the Secretary of State and the ability to do 20 business in your own name. That helps inform our "what," 21 right, but the "what" is really the anonymity at issue,

which was the harm and the problem that Congress was seeking to address.

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THE COURT: And how do you look at that as purely a state function? I mean, states have determined that

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   being anonymous is a goal and a desire. And so this idea
 2
   that they're doing channels of commerce to try to overstep
   the states in that regard seems like that would give you
 3
 4
   carte-blanche authority to do anything under the Commerce
   Clause.
 5
 6
            MS. LOWRY:
                        Well, I think there is the
 7
   channels-and-instrumentalities inquiry, but our primary
 8
   arguments looked at either direct regulation of interstate
   activity or, in the sort of Raich realm, intrastate
 9
   activities that have substantial effects on interstate
10
11
   commerce or the comprehensive regulatory scheme, which we
12
   see through the Anti-Money Laundering Act.
13
            THE COURT:
                        So what do you think is your best
14
   argument under the Commerce Clause, then?
15
            MS. LOWRY:
                        I believe the best argument under the
16
   Commerce Clause is the substantial effects on interstate
17
   commerce, even to the extent that the activities are purely
18
   intrastate.
19
            And here, we have the findings from the agency
20
   which were articulated through Congress that money
21
   laundering and tax evasion create 300 billion, with a B,
22
   dollars of profit annually and that the Government does not
23
   have the tools that they need to address that problem.
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Laundering Act has the interstate nexus. Then we look

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The Plaintiffs here have conceded the Anti-Money

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if -- if the -- the question should be does the corporate anonymity problem have a substantial impact on interstate commerce. Yes. That is why Congress passed this law.
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And Congress didn't say -- I believe the Plaintiffs, in the Plaintiffs' argument, said it would be useful or it would benefit the Government to have this information.

Congress said this information is needed. That is the Section 6402(5) of the Act. This information is necessary to address this problem, and that is sufficient under the Commerce Clause and, in particular, because the Court's inquiry is not really to judge anew the policy interests of Congress in this area but to ask whether Congress had a basis for concluding that that connection exists. That is apparent on the face of the statute, and that's enough to survive the Commerce Clause challenge.

THE COURT: Now, is your argument -- are we assuming that these companies are violating some criminal statute just because -- you're requiring everyone to do this registration, and so that's why I'm struggling with this idea that -- does that mean that you're assuming everyone is somehow in violation of the law?

MS. LOWRY: No, your Honor. It's recognition of the difficulty of the problem. You already have these anonymous corporations and businesses for which you cannot

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identify any real human person. I don't think it would be
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 2
   effective to then ask this anonymous person that you can't
   find, even through subpoena and warrant powers, when you go
 3
 4
   through these very in-depth investigations, "Can you please
   disclose yourself? We would like you to register with
 5
 6
   FinCEN."
 7
            What has been determined is that there is this
   comprehensive regulatory framework and what is needed is
 8
   this information so that the bad apples can be identified.
10
                        But, you know, I -- I have
            THE COURT:
11
   money-laundering and wire-fraud cases -- criminal cases all
12
   the time, so there's mechanisms for that already. It seems
13
   like you're adding on and basically requiring everyone to
   register that -- casting this wide net. And I guess I'm
14
15
   just trying to understand where does that stop, then?
                        I would have two responses.
16
            MS. LOWRY:
            One here, your Honor, is to acknowledge that
17
18
   Plaintiffs are bringing a facial challenge under the
   Commerce Clause, and they have argued that we are applying
19
20
   the inappropriate standard under Salerno to say that they
21
   need to show that there would be no constitutional
22
   applications to satisfy that facial challenge.
23
   said you listened to the Eleventh Circuit argument.
24
   was heavily featured there in the questions by the judges
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on the panel.

The Supreme Court clarified that that is the appropriate test just this term in *Rahimi*, which was a Second-Amendment challenge. So, again, a constitutional claim, a facial challenge outside of the First-Amendment context affirming that *Salerno* is the proper standard.

So Plaintiffs, I believe, cite an Eleventh -- at least out-of-circuit authority, the *Club Madonna* Eleventh Circuit case from 2022. That can't overcome *Rahimi* now, 2024, saying that this is the "most difficult challenge to mount successfully" because it requires the Plaintiff to "establish no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."

So we don't need to look for the most fringe cases, you know, businesses that truly have no nexus to interstate commerce in any fashion, to deny the facial challenge and say there are clear cases of businesses operating in interstate commerce on their own.

I think here the NFIB Plaintiff is the most problematic for Plaintiff. There are 300,000 business members of NFIB. They are not members of a trade organization because they have no business, hold no assets, and are not engaged in any commerce. They can't show there are no constitutional applications even as to the named Plaintiffs among them, and they -- for that reason alone, they can't satisfy their burden.

1 THE COURT: And then I know you touched on this, 2 but how is the CTA part of a broader regulatory scheme? The broader regulatory scheme is the 3 MS. LOWRY: 4 Anti-Money Laundering Act, which itself was originally passed sort of through the Bank Secrecy Act. 5 looking at more like, you know, 30 and 50 years of history. 6 7 But the Corporate Transparency Act itself was Section 6400 8 going down but as part of the 6000 division, which is the Anti-Money Laundering Act. It was the Anti-Money Laundering Act that directs Treasury to collect this 10 11 information. Then when you get down to 6400, you see what 12 types of information it's being directed to collect. 13 THE COURT: So what is your authority for -- just 14 because Congress has legislated against these financial 15 crimes -- that the CTA is part of a broader regulatory scheme? 16 17 That, I believe, is the sort of Raich MS. LOWRY: 18 and related tests, that you can regulate interstate 19 activity that is -- if a comprehensive regulatory scheme 20 would be undermined by failing in the absence of these 21 means, I think the \$300 billion of money-laundering and 22 tax-evasion profits, while the anti-money laundering 23 statute has been on the books for years and years, 24 demonstrates that -- or at least supports Congress' finding 25 of that need.

Ι

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1
            THE COURT:
                        And are you still asserting the
   channels of commerce argument that you make in the briefs?
 2
 3
            MS. LOWRY:
                        Yes.
                              Yes, your Honor. And that is
 4
   because I don't hear Plaintiffs to be disputing that their
   Plaintiffs use the channels of interstate commerce.
 5
            And this is the --
 6
 7
            THE COURT:
                        I don't think they deny that either,
 8
   but the issue really is under that kind of argument, where
 9
   does it stop? I mean, why is that not just a general
10
   police power to do whatever Congress wants to do?
11
   seems a bridge too far.
12
            MS. LOWRY: I think that it is in the rational
13
   relations test of Congress' power. And you need to also
14
   have, you know -- I really think the answer is, your Honor,
15
   here for the facial challenge we, again, aren't looking at
16
   the very edges of the case and the concern of how broad the
17
   limiting principle at issue. We need to look for the clear
18
                          That's what Rahimi specifically
   cases in the middle.
19
   addresses.
               We don't need to look at hypotheticals at the
20
   fringe; we need to look at the center of the power.
21
            THE COURT: And switching to the taxing power --
22
   and did you want to talk about anything else about -- I
23
   asked my questions regarding Commerce Clause, but did you
24
   have anything else you wanted to add on that or --
25
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I do just very briefly, your Honor.

MS. LOWRY:

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1
   was taking a couple notes.
 2
            In addition to the Firestone opinion, we did also
   have one additional case with a denial of a P.I. -- request
 3
 4
   for a preliminary injunction related to the Corporate
 5
   Transparency Act. That was the SBA case, 1:24-cv-315,
   Western District of Michigan.
 6
 7
                        Would you give that cite again?
            THE COURT:
            MS. LOWRY: Yes.
 8
                               It's 1:24-cv-315, Western
   District of Michigan.
 9
            That P.I. was denied from the bench.
10
11
   judgment is now fully briefed. But just kind of looking at
12
   the full balance there, we do have the two denials, the one
13
   grant up on appeal.
14
            THE COURT:
                        There is not a written opinion on
15
   that?
16
            MS. LOWRY:
                        No written opinion, correct.
17
            THE COURT:
                        Okay.
18
            MS. LOWRY:
                        Looking at my notes.
19
            Plaintiffs, again, have focused a lot in their
20
   commerce power argument on the idea that there are
21
   businesses that do no commerce. I just want to highlight
22
   that that does not apply to even the named Plaintiffs in
23
   this lawsuit.
24
            Texas Top Cop Shop, obviously, is engaged in
25
   commerce. They have employees. They are a -- hold a
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federal firearms license which requires them to report
 1
 2
   their responsible persons, at least as it pertains to their
 3
   qun sale business.
            DataComm, according to their declarations, does
 4
   business with public utilities and federal -- not their
 5
   declarations, excuse me. It's paragraph 65 of the
 6
 7
   Compliant. They do business with federal agencies and
 8
   public utilities.
            The parties in this case are not even the fringe
10
   cases that Plaintiffs are using to support their argument
11
   that we're outside the commerce power.
12
            I am ready to move past that if you are, your
13
   Honor.
14
            THE COURT: Okay.
                               That's fine. I just have a
15
   couple of other questions.
16
            But the CTA is in no way a tax, right? I mean, I
   don't see how that's a tax.
17
18
                             The CTA is not itself a tax, your
            MS. LOWRY:
                        No.
19
   Honor; it is a tool for ensuring that proper taxes are
20
   collected given -- and justified by the volume of the
21
   problem of tax evasion as found by Congress.
22
            THE COURT: And so how does the CTA somehow help
23
   the administration of taxes aside from identifying tax
24
   fraud?
25
            MS. LOWRY:
                        It doesn't even itself, your Honor,
```

identify tax fraud. It ensures that -- the information of who the beneficial owners are, who the flesh-and-blood people making decisions at these corporate entities is, so that if you have, you know, cause and suspicion of tax fraud, there are records in existence that you can use when investigating those crimes.

It is not -- so it's a tool in the toolbox to ensure that those records even exist in the first place based on Congress' finding and the agency experience in investigating these types of crimes, that you often go through these exhaustive investigations and you still turn nothing up.

THE COURT: So it's not a tax. I'm just trying to understand how we have authority under this clause to actually support the CTA.

MS. LOWRY: Well, I think it's the Necessary and Proper Clause as applied to the taxing power.

And then we're looking at the necessary and proper cases and case law that really do give Congress the breadth and means to effectuate the powers that it has, which here includes the taxing power.

THE COURT: Right. But it has to be related to the taxing power, and it's not a tax. And isn't that a stretch to use the Necessary and Proper Clause which, again, goes back to the core power, which is taxing, and

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1
   there's no taxing here?
 2
                        I think it is just a straightforward
            MS. LOWRY:
 3
   application of the Necessary and Proper to achieve the
 4
   taxing power itself. That would be our argument.
 5
            THE COURT: So what is the limit, then, to using
   the Necessary and Proper Clause of -- on the issue of
 6
 7
            There has to be a limit somewhere.
   taxing?
            MS. LOWRY:
 8
                        Sure?
 9
            THE COURT:
                        Where do we draw the line?
                        I think the line to be drawn is from
10
            MS. LOWRY:
11
   the cases themself in Comstock and whether Congress had a
12
   rational basis for drawing this connection between the
13
   means and the ends.
            THE COURT: And then for foreign affairs power,
14
15
   where do you perceive the national security interest that's
   involved in the CTA?
16
17
            MS. LOWRY: I think this is the findings by
18
   Congress that there are foreign corporations who are using
19
   the anonymity that they can maintain in the United States
20
   to commit crimes here.
21
            And we -- your Honor, we can look at the language
22
   of the corporate transparency itself, 6402(4), where
23
   Congress provides:
                        "Money launderers intentionally conduct
24
   transactions through corporate structures in order to evade
25
   detection and may layer such structures, much like Russian
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nesting 'Matryoshka' dolls, across various secretive jurisdictions such that each time an investigator obtains ownership records for a domestic or foreign entity, the newly identified entity is yet another corporate entity, necessitating a repeat of the same process."
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But even beyond the sort of rabbit hole of continuous corporate formation — the language of the final rule — when investigators trace illicit funds to a corporation or similar entity, they often find that corporate ownership records are not attainable, quote, because they do not exist. This, quote, lack of transparency has been a primary obstacle to tackling financial crime in the modern area. That's the House report and the final rule.

So then we have, to that end -- this is language from the Anti-Money Laundering Act, and that's where I'm saying that is the comprehensive scheme of which the Corporate Transparency Act is just one part.

Requiring the Treasury Department to establish uniform beneficial ownership information reporting requirements to, (A), improve transparency for national security, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies and financial institutions; (B), discourage the use of cell corporations as a tool to disguise and move illicit funds.

We have in-depth and specific findings for why

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this requirement is necessary, not merely convenient, to
1
 2
   battle what Plaintiffs concede is interstate activity, here
   criminal activity in the form of money laundering.
 3
 4
            THE COURT: And then is there any kind of treaty
 5
   in play in this case?
 6
            MS. LOWRY:
                        I am not aware of one as I stand here
7
                        I -- if we cited one in our brief, I'm
   today, your Honor.
 8
   just -- it's not coming to my mind.
            THE COURT:
                        That's fine.
            And then -- and I'll check the briefs on that.
10
11
            What is the international standard the U.S. has
12
   fallen out of step with?
13
            MS. LOWRY: I do not know the answer to that, your
14
            I would be happy to address it in further briefing.
15
   Only that that is the findings of Congress, that we have
16
   fallen out of step with international money-laundering
17
   standards.
18
                        And then what is your view -- what are
            THE COURT:
19
   the guardrails on the foreign affairs power that
20
   Congress -- there has to be some kind of guardrails.
                                                           So
21
   what is -- in your view, what is the guardrails for how we
22
   look at that?
23
            MS. LOWRY:
                        I believe, again, the quardrails are
24
   the findings of Congress and the availability of the Court
25
   to review, even on a deferential standard, whether Congress
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had a basis for concluding that the means justify the ends.
1
 2
   The necessary and proper test is still going to be the
   bounds on that power.
 3
 4
            THE COURT: And then -- and I was going to ask you
   in the beginning and I didn't ask that, but -- because it
 5
   was really I think your briefing that indicated or implied
 6
 7
   that they were seeking a nationwide injunction, which they
 8
   said they are not.
            My question, though, for the Government is let's
10
   say the Court grants some kind of injunction for these
11
   parties. How does that impact anybody else going forward?
12
   I mean --
13
            MS. LOWRY: I would have two responses, your
14
   Honor.
15
            I think there are two totally dissimilar
   categories of Plaintiffs here. You have the sort of
16
17
    individual businesses, and we can even include MSLP there.
18
   Then you have NFIB, which everyone agrees is exempt from
19
   the CTA already. They do not have to file.
20
            Plaintiffs are seeking injunctive relief on behalf
21
   of their 300,000 members, which really is nationwide
22
   injunctive relief.
                        Those parties are not before the Court.
23
   I think they totally defeat the facial challenge here
24
   because they demonstrate real business is taking place.
25
   There are 300,000 of them who decided to be members in this
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trade association.

So for all practical purposes, the limit that they have offered here before the Court is a concession, and one we welcome, but their brief sought to enjoin the CTA, period, full stop. And if they were granted relief as to NFIB's members who have not even been named or disclosed, that would be effective nationwide relief.

I think the -- to your Honor's latter point, that would be a significant harm to the public interest in this case because that would be 300,000 businesses excluded from the reporting requirements -- which, you know, to be effective, there has to be participation. We're talking about excluding unnamed companies in a way that would totally frustrate the goals and aims of the CTA and its compliance standards.

THE COURT: Well, but, you know, if the Court would ever -- it gets to the point of saying Congress exceeded their authority, shouldn't there be some kind of relief like that anyways?

And there's a mechanism if a Court grants an injunction. The Government can appeal and, you know -- I get it -- i have a lot of appeals go to the Fifth Circuit, and so I'm not -- and then they can determine whether or not I was right or wrong if I grant any kind of relief.

But, I mean, it seems to me that the idea that it

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would thwart the goal of the CTA -- I understand that, but
they only get there if -- if the Court is convinced that
they have a likelihood of success on the merits is a good
one, well, there should be relief, you know.
        So that's why I asked the question to them,
because of what you said in your brief. And I'm going to
have them come back and answer this question about although
they only asked for the parties, the 300,000 members is a
legitimate issue. Is it, in effect, giving nationwide
relief in a way? But I'll ask him that question.
        MS. LOWRY: Yes, your Honor.
                                      I mean, I,
obviously, acknowledge there are always potential appeal
rights. There is a process to go through. We have argued
there's no likelihood of success.
                                   If you find there is a
likelihood of success, we turn to the other elements.
        We would still arque that the equities favor the
Government here versus -- for individual businesses filing
their BOI information versus, you know, enjoining duly
enacted law of Congress.
        But I take your Honor's point. If you find that
it exceeded the power, you're obviously going to find that
the interest the Government has in the policy is decreased.
        THE COURT:
                    And then if you want to address -- I
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know he discussed a couple of the constitutional claims.

Again, I didn't ask a lot of questions -- although I have

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questions in those areas, I didn't ask them just because I
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 2
    just -- I try to be as candid and open as possible to
   attorneys. I don't think that's their best argument in
 3
 4
   terms of it -- in terms of their attempt to get relief, so
   that's the reason I didn't do that.
 5
 6
            But you're welcome to respond to that or anything
7
   else you want to say. I have asked all these questions,
 8
   but I still want to give you the opportunity if you have
   some other points on issues that I've already addressed or
 9
10
   even any amendments. That's up to you.
11
            MS. LOWRY: Thank you, your Honor. It feels like
12
   an area where I'm likely to do more harm than good for
13
   myself, given those caveats. I would just, though,
14
   highlight the NetChoice --
15
            THE COURT: You know, it's funny you say that
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   because, you know, one of the hardest things I do is
   sentencings all the time and I just had a sentencing
17
18
   yesterday where I was prepared to give a person a downward
19
   variance, and then he started on the allocution saying, "I
20
   didn't intentionally do this."
21
            And I stopped him right away and said, "You're
22
   going down a path that may do more harm."
23
            Ultimately, I gave him -- I did -- he talked to
24
   his counsel and, you know, got it together, and I gave him
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a break. But anyhow -- sorry, that's a total aside.

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MS. LOWRY:
 1
                         Yes.
 2
            THE COURT:
                         I understand.
 3
            MS. LOWRY:
                         Only --
 4
            THE COURT:
                         Again, I'm giving you the opportunity
 5
   to say anything you want to say.
 6
            MS. LOWRY:
                         Only, then, to highlight the NetChoice
 7
   case this term from the Supreme Court, because I don't
   believe it was addressed in our briefing, addressed the
 8
   standard for these overbreadth facial challenges and said
10
   the choice to litigate these cases as facial challenges,
11
   quote, comes at a cost.
                             This Court has made facial
12
   challenges hard to win. So in the singular context, even a
13
   law with a plainly legitimate sweep may be struck down in
   its entirety only if the law's unconstitutional
14
15
   applications substantially outweigh its constitutional
16
   ones.
17
            So because it was not addressed in the briefing,
18
   relatively new this case -- this term case, I would put
   NetChoice before the Court. And besides that, I would rest
19
20
   on our briefs.
21
            THE COURT:
                         Thank you.
22
            And I will tell you that, you know, if for some
23
   reason -- and I just don't know yet because I don't -- I'll
24
   take this matter under advisement. I don't have an answer.
25
   It's very challenging questions, and I know more about the
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Commerce Clause than I thought I ever would know. And I've been on the bench for a while, but I haven't had to deal with Commerce Clause issues.
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And so that's been the majority of my focus in preparation for today, so -- but I will tell you -- and I will give the parties an opportunity and we'll do it by telephone. If for some reason I need to turn to the constitutional claims, I do have -- I probably will have some questions about that.

But if we did that, I'd follow up with another supplemental hearing just via telephone. So I just wanted to -- because I know I don't want to -- I'm not trying to -- I don't mean give short shrift to those claims. My review, it just seems like the better claims were what I concentrated my time on, but I don't -- if I need to reach those claims, because if I find relief on the part -- first part, I don't have to -- I won't address the constitutional claims.

But if I find that the Commerce Clause and those claims -- those aren't going to work, I'm going to have to address the constitutional claims. And if that happens, I will give you -- everyone an opportunity to argue that and we'll do it via telephone.

Okay. I just wanted to say that so -MS. LOWRY: Thank you, your Honor, for -- we,

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1
   obviously, welcome that invitation.
 2
            For the reasons I've said here today and for the
   reasons in our brief, we would ask that Plaintiffs' motion
 3
 4
   for a preliminary injunction be denied in its entirety.
 5
            THE COURT:
                        Okay. Thank you.
                        Thank you, your Honor.
 6
            MS. LOWRY:
 7
            THE COURT:
                        Just a couple of things we want to
 8
   address, and, of course, then you can also decide to
 9
   respond to anything that's been said.
            I would like to address the issue of the
10
11
                      The Government's response is, you know,
   irreparable harm.
12
   declarations are conclusory and that's not enough.
13
   cite Judge O'Connor's case. So I'll give you a chance to
14
   respond to that.
15
            MR. KRUCKENBERG: Your Honor, I think the Fifth
16
   Circuit's analysis in the --
17
            THE COURT:
                        Is your mic -- it's dropped down or --
18
            MR. KRUCKENBERG:
                              My apologies.
            All right. Hopefully, that's better.
19
20
            Your Honor, the Fifth Circuit's analysis in the
21
   Restaurant Center case -- I forget the actual name of
22
   the -- it's the one we cited in our brief -- I think
23
   decides the issue of irreparable harm just on compliance
24
   costs.
25
            In that case, that was the issue, de minimis harm
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versus proof of harm in a regulation that was -- had already calculated the costs. And the Fifth Circuit said that's enough.

And in some sense, it's because we take the
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Government at their word. If they say there are compliance costs and there are substantial compliance costs, that probably means that that's at least true that there are some compliance costs.

And each of the Plaintiffs has said we have to gather this information at cost to us. It's -- I mean, FinCEN has calculated the hourly rate as several hundred dollars. I think they've even calculated the individual compliance costs as greater than \$1,200. That's something we put in our brief.

And I think this kind of hair splitting, well, \$200 may be enough, 100 isn't, I don't think we have to get there. I think the Fifth Circuit has been very clear on this.

And, again, because these are constitutional claims, that gets us there as well. And the Fifth Circuit has also been very clear. A deprivation of any constitutional right is irreparable harm if there's no remedy. And there's no remedy.

So it doesn't matter which way you look at it. I think there is very clearly an irreparable harm facing the

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They have to do something. They're -- they
Plaintiffs.
have -- they're looking at the compliance date.
                                                 And once
they file, they have an ongoing obligation to update, to
maintain, to -- if any information changes.
        So I think it is very hard for them to say there's
no irreparable harm, assuming this is invalid, which is
what this Court has to do when assessing that factor.
        THE COURT: And then what about -- what's your
response on the issue of the 300,000 members? You're not
seeking nationwide injunction, but the Government says in
practicality you kind of are because the one member has
300,000 members. What do you say to that?
        MR. KRUCKENBERG: Your Honor, I take the
conceptual concern with nationwide injunctions applying to
nonparties at face value. And assuming that is a problem,
that's not a problem this Court has to deal with because we
have parties before the Court. And it is a fundamental
aspect --
                    Well, that doesn't answer the
        THE COURT:
question, though.
                   I mean --
        MR. KRUCKENBERG:
                          Yeah.
        THE COURT: -- is it true that one client has
300,000 members that, in effect, would -- or could be --
you know, although not called a nationwide injunction, it
has that same impact?
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Well, it has on the parties
            MR. KRUCKENBERG:
 2
   before the Court because NFIB is here in a
   representation -- in a representative capacity for its
 3
 4
   members, which includes some of the named Plaintiffs but
   obviously not all of them.
 5
 6
            I mean, if the United States' position is we have
 7
   to list them as Plaintiffs to be able to make them parties,
 8
   I mean, that's just not true. That's not the way our legal
   system considers multiple Plaintiffs or these sort of
10
   complicated cases.
11
            And if it's a matter of practicality, we can
12
   certainly file a membership list as of the time of the
13
   injunction with the Court under seal. I mean, obviously,
   we have concerns about privacy, and that's part of the
14
15
   lawsuit. But there is a way to deal with that.
                        That's not the concern the Court has.
16
            THE COURT:
17
   It's -- I'm just trying to determine, although you say
18
   you're not asking for a nationwide injunction, could that
19
   be the impact if the Court grants you relief to just the
   Plaintiffs?
20
21
            MR. KRUCKENBERG: I mean, effectively, the members
22
                          There are members in every state.
   are nationwide, yes.
23
   But they are parties to this case, and they are in front of
24
   this Court.
25
            And so if the concerns are about the Court's
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equitable powers, which is what this debate usually centers
on, there is no doubt that NFIB's members are before this
       They are within this Court's jurisdiction.
                                                    And so
United States is within this Court's jurisdiction.
I don't see an issue.
        THE COURT: And then address the Government's
response to the -- looking at the various equities that she
asserts side with the Government or weigh with the
Government in terms of granting any kind of injunction.
                          Well -- and, again, I would rely
        MR. KRUCKENBERG:
on the Fifth Circuit. I mean, this lives and dies in a lot
of ways on the merits because the Fifth Circuit, I think,
has been very clear. When we have a regulatory obligation
like this, if it's invalid -- the Government has no
interest in maintaining invalid law and making people
follow an invalid law and incurring costs to do so.
        And in the preliminary injunction context, I mean,
that is the appropriate -- this is the appropriate
           We're saying this law shouldn't take effect.
mechanism.
This is a time-out, so you don't have to incur these
potentially unlawful compliance obligations and, here,
potentially unconstitutional obligations. And so I think
the Fifth Circuit has just been very clear on that.
        THE COURT: And then her argument in terms of --
her best argument on the Commerce Clause was substantial
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1
   effects on interstate commerce.
                                     If you want to respond to
 2
   that?
 3
            MR. KRUCKENBERG:
                              Yes, your Honor.
 4
            And, actually, just to back up one second -- I
 5
   very much want to address that point, but I also want to
   address this no-set-of-circumstances, facial versus
 6
 7
   as-applied argument.
 8
            With respect to the Commerce Clause -- because I
 9
   think what the Government has tried to do is they've tried
10
   to treat all constitutional claims equally and apply this
11
    Salerno test to all three. And that's not what the Court
12
   has indicated, and that's not what the NetChoice case
13
   indicated. I mean, that was a Second Amendment case -- or,
14
   I mean, sorry, the Rahimi case that we're talking about.
15
            THE COURT:
                        Which case -- that case helps give the
16
   Court a little more clarity. I've had a lot of those gun
17
   cases, so it's --
18
            MR. KRUCKENBERG:
                               Yes, your Honor.
                                                 And --
19
            THE COURT:
                        There are still some percolating so --
20
            MR. KRUCKENBERG: And, obviously, there's a
21
   different analysis for different constitutional rights.
22
            And if we're -- we're thinking about the commerce
23
   either as applied or facially. I mean, we've pled both
24
   because it's unclear.
25
            If you look at Morrison, that was an individual
```

litigant who raised a facial challenge to the federal statute, and the United States Supreme Court struck down the federal statute because it didn't apply to Morrison. So, essentially, they have applied an overbreadth kind of analysis in commerce challenges.

So if truly this Salerno no-set-of-circumstances test applied to commerce challenges, Morrison and Lopez could not possibly have come out that way. There are plenty of instances where those could have been constitutional prosecutions or where somebody engaged in interstate commerce that was within the reach of those statutes.

And so I think what the lesson there is, we look at the statute. Does the statute reach commercial activity or not? And that, I think, gets into the *Gonzales versus* Raich argument and the substantial effects test. And reading Gonzales, they are very clear. It has to be an economic class of activities. That's what must be regulated to reach the intrastate conduct.

This is not an economic class of activities if we look at the statute. The statute applies when you file a registration document. That is not economic. That is a registry. That is a noneconomic activity that just so happens to be one that lots of businesses engage in, and that is not substantial effect on interstate commerce.

And, your Honor, just to address the foreign affairs issue, I just wanted to answer a question that you asked me earlier about the authorities we're relying on.

I just want to direct the Court to one of the cases we mentioned in our briefing. It's *Dunbar versus*Seger-Thomschitz. It's a Fifth Circuit case. The reason I point that out is it talks about the foreign affairs powers and how Courts look at them. And the Court there said -- the Fifth Circuit said that when something is within the realm of traditional state responsibilities, it's not -- it does not implicate the foreign affairs powers.

And I think that is -- rings true in this case because, again, we have -- the federal government tried to displace the state regulatory system on this national level even though this is a traditional state interest.

And I would also just point out the CTA doesn't apply internationally. Any international entity to have to register has to have a presence in the U.S., so they have to register to do business with a state.

So, again, this kind of idea that it's international, yes, it may incidentally effect some international interests. That's not the sweep of the statute, and we have no idea how often that might even come up. It may never come up. That's clearly not enough to justify this entire regime.

```
1
            And if the Court has no other questions, we'll
 2
   rest on our briefing.
 3
            THE COURT: Okay. Very good.
 4
            Well, thank y'all both for your arguments.
                                                         Ι
   enjoyed those immensely, and I will take the matter under
 5
   advisement. I understand the time constraints, and I will
 6
 7
   try to make a decision, you know, as quick as I can.
 8
            So -- and I will -- well, I don't want to promise
   anything in terms of a date or anything, but we will work
 9
   on it diligently and get you an answer in plenty of time.
10
11
            I have issued two nationwide injunctions -- now,
12
   the one wasn't my fault. I got a lot of criticism for it
13
   by parties because they didn't file their request for
   injunctive -- not by the parties but by the public years
14
15
   ago. But the motion for injunction came, like, right
   before the deadline so -- for the rule to go into effect,
16
   so it wasn't my fault. But you've brought this in plenty
17
   of attention -- plenty of time for the Court to resolve it,
18
   and I will get it resolved in plenty of time so --
19
20
            But, otherwise, we'll be in recess. Thank y'all.
21
            (Proceedings concluded, 10:31 a.m.)
22
   COURT REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION
23
              I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT ON THIS DATE, DECEMBER 16,
   2024, THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE RECORD
24
   OF PROCEEDINGS.
25
                         /s/
                      CHRISTINA L. BICKHAM, CRR, RDR
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EXHIBIT B

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

TEXAS TOP COP SHOP, INC., ET AL., Plaintiffs,

FIFTH CIRCUIT DOCKET NO.: 24-40792

DISTRICT COURT NO.: 4:24-CV-478

DECLARATION OF CHRISTIAN CLASE

MERRICK GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL..

Defendants.

v.

DECLARATION OF CHRISTIAN CLASE

- I, Christian Clase, make the following declaration under penalty of perjury pursuant to the laws of the United States:
- 1. I am over the age of 18, am under no legal disability, and am competent to testify. If called as a witness, I would and could testify competently to the facts set forth in this declaration based on my personal knowledge.
 - 2. I am an attorney licensed in Tennessee.
- 3. After the injunction was issued, FinCEN posted a notice on its website that the January 1, 2025, reporting date was no longer in effect. Ex. A.
- 4. Exhibit "A" is a screenshot of FinCEN's website, that I took on December 17, 2024, that shows the notice FinCEN posted in response to the injunction.
- 5. Since this Court preliminarily enjoyed the CTA, I have observed extensive media coverage concerning the CTA in both traditional news publications and legal blogs. These articles explain, to a wide audience, that the CTA and its reporting rule were enjoined by a federal court, and that reporting companies are no longer required to submit beneficial ownership information on January 1, 2025. Ex.'s B, C, D, & E.

6. Exhibits "B" "C," "D," and "E" are true and correct PDF copies of online news articles, and in their respective order, were published on the websites of Reuters, the United States Chamber of Commerce, Bloomberg Tax, and the Wall Street Journal.

- 7. Since the CTA was enjoined, many law firms have advised their clients about the injunction, and I have seen several firm-wide communications and mass mailing efforts concerning the injunction. Ex.'s F, G, H & I.
- 8. Exhibits "F," "G," "H," and "I" are true and correct PDF copies of articles law firms have posted on their own websites discussing the CTA's injunction, and, in their respective order, these articles appeared on the websites of Gibson Dunn; Skadden, Arps Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP; Holland and Knight; and Baker Hostetler.
- 9. I have also been contacted by other attorneys and members of the business community seeking information about the effect of the preliminary injunction on their clients', or their own, reporting obligations.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on December 17, 2024:

/S/ Christian Clase Christian Clase

ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT A

FINANCIAL CRIMES



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About FinCEN



Many companies are required to report information to FinCEN about the individuals who ultimately own or control them. FinCEN began accepting reports on January 1, 2024. <u>Learn more about reporting deadlines.</u>

Prepare

- → How do I file?
- Do I qualify for an exemption?
- → How do I get a FinCEN ID?

File

- → File a report using the BOI E-Filing System
- Create a FinCEN ID (optional)



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Alert: Impact of Ongoing Litigation – Deadline Stay – Voluntary Submission Only

In light of a recent federal court order, reporting companies are not currently required to file beneficial ownership information with FinCEN and are not subject to liability if they fail to do so while the order remains in force. However, reporting companies may continue to voluntarily submit beneficial ownership information reports.

The Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) plays a vital role in protecting the U.S. and international financial systems, as well as people across the country, from illicit finance threats like terrorist financing, drug trafficking, and money laundering. The CTA levels the playing field for tens of millions of law-abiding small businesses across the United States and makes it harder for bad actors to exploit loopholes in order to gain an unfair advantage.

On Tuesday, December 3, 2024, in the case of *Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc., et al. v. Garland, et al.*, No. 4:24-cv-00478 (E.D. Tex.), a federal district court in the Eastern District of Texas, Sherman Division, issued an order granting a nationwide preliminary injunction that: (1) enjoins the CTA, including enforcement of that statute and regulations implementing its beneficial ownership information reporting requirements, and, specifically, (2) stays all deadlines to comply with the CTA's reporting requirements. The Department of Justice, on behalf of the Department of the Treasury, filed a Notice of Appeal on December 5, 2024.

Texas Top Cop Shop is only one of several cases in which plaintiffs have challenged the CTA that are pending before courts around the country. Several district courts have denied requests to enjoin the CTA, ruling in favor of the Department of the Treasury. The government continues to believe—consistent with the conclusions of the U.S. District Courts for the Eastern District of Virginia and the District of Oregon—that the CTA is constitutional.

While this litigation is ongoing, FinCEN will comply with the order issued by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas for as long as it remains in effect. Therefore, reporting companies are not currently required to file their beneficial ownership information with FinCEN and will not be subject to liability if they fail to do so while the preliminary injunction remains in effect. Nevertheless, reporting companies may continue to voluntarily submit beneficial ownership information reports.

EXHIBIT B

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Texas judge blocks anti-money laundering law's enforcement nationwide

By Nate Raymond

December 4, 2024 11:39 AM CST · Updated 13 days ago









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A bronze seal for the Department of the Treasury is shown at the U.S. Treasury building in Washington, U.S., January 20, 2023. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights

Dec 4 (Reuters) - A federal judge in Texas has issued a nationwide injunction blocking the enforcement of an anti-money laundering law that requires corporate entities to disclose to the U.S. Treasury Department the identities of their real beneficial owners.

U.S. District Judge Amos Mazzant in Sherman, Texas, on Tuesday sided ☐ with the National Federation Of Independent Business and several small businesses and non-profits by

Case: 24-40792 Concluding the 2021 Corporate Transparency Act w	Document: 34 as likely unconstitu	Page: 110	Date Filed: 12/17/202	4
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The decision marked the second time a judge has d				
Alabama federal judge reached a similar conclusion challenge to the law but issued a narrower injunction			to	
the parties before him, including the National Smal				
Mazzant said the law was an "unprecedented" atte in an area traditionally left to the states by monitori				
and ending the anonymity various states provide in				
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"For good reason, Plaintiffs fear this flanking, quasi-Orwellian statute and its implications on our dual system of government," Mazzant wrote.

He said Congress had no authority under its powers to regulate commerce, taxes and foreign

Case: 24-40792 Document: 34 Page: 111 Date Filed: 12/17/2024 affairs to adopt such a law and that it likely violated states' rights under the U.S. Constitution's

Tenth Amendment.

The Justice Department declined to comment on Wednesday.

The bipartisan measure was enacted as part of an annual defense spending toward the end of Republican President-elect Donald Trump's first term in early January 2021, after Congress overrode a veto Trump issued for unrelated reasons.

Supporters of the legislation said it was designed to address the country's growing popularity as a venue for criminals to launder illicit funds by setting up entities like limited liability companies under state laws without disclosing their involvement.

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Under the law, corporations and LLCs were required to report information concerning their beneficial owners to the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, which collects and analyzes information about financial transactions to combat money laundering and other crimes.

The lawsuit was filed in May by lawyers at the Center for Individual Rights on behalf of five small

Case: 24-40792 Document: 34 Page: 112 Date Filed: 12/17/2024 entities and the National Federation of Independent Business, a 300,000-member trade group that represents small businesses.

Mazzant is one of two judges assigned to hear cases in Sherman, Texas. He was appointed to the bench by Democratic former President Barack Obama as part of a deal with Texas' two Republican senators on a group of judicial nominees in the state and is known for ruling in favor of conservative litigants.

He blocked the law's enforcement ahead of a Jan. 1 deadline for companies to comply with its requirements.

Caleb Kruckenberg, the center's litigation director, said Mazzant's preliminary injunction would provide small businesses "a reprieve while the courts, and likely the Supreme Court, can consider the constitutional issues further."

The case is Texas Top Cop Shop v. Garland, et al, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, No. 4:24-cv-00478.

For the National Federation Of Independent Business: Caleb Kruckenberg of the Center for Individual Rights

For the U.S.: Stuart Robinson and Faith Lowry of the U.S. Department of Justice

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Nate Raymond reports on the federal judiciary and litigation. He can be reached at nate.raymond@thomsonreuters.com.

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


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


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





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Home / Insights / After Nationwide Injunction of Corporate Transparency Act, FinCEN Suspends Reporting Requirements as Four Circuits Grapple With Act's Constitutionality

After Nationwide Injunction of Corporate Transparency Act, FinCEN Suspends Reporting Requirements as Four Circuits Grapple With Act's Constitutionality

December 13, 2024

Skadden Publication

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The Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) and its implementing regulations (Regulations) require entities within its scope (reporting companies) to disclose information, including about their beneficial owners, to the U.S. Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).

The Regulations set a reporting deadline of January 1, 2025, for initial reports to be filed by reporting companies formed before 2024 and require reporting companies formed beginning in 2024 to file within specified time periods following their formation (within 90 days for entities formed during 2024 and within 30 days for entities formed after 2024).

Plaintiffs throughout the country have challenged the CTA's constitutionality. In *Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc. v. Garland*, No. 4:24-cv-478 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2024), the court enjoined the CTA nationwide and stayed the Regulations' reporting deadlines. This injunction comes on the heels of three district court decisions handed down earlier this year, reaching different conclusions about the CTA's constitutionality.

In deciding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional challenge,

Case: 24-40792 Document: 34 Page: 123 Date Filed: 12/17/2024 the court in *Texas Top Cop Shop* agreed with an earlier decision from a district court in the Northern District of Alabama, which held that the CTA is not a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause or of Congress's taxing and foreign-relations powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause. By contrast, district courts in the District of Oregon and the Eastern District of Virginia have held that plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their arguments that the CTA exceeded Congress's powers. All four cases are now on appeal — to the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.

The nationwide injunction prevents the government from enforcing the reporting requirements of the CTA and the Regulations, and on December 6, 2025, FinCEN suspended reporting while the injunction remains in effect. But reporting companies should stay attuned to further developments. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has appealed *Texas Top Cop Shop* to the Fifth Circuit and has asked for a stay of the injunction pending the appeal. If the nationwide injunction is dissolved or stayed, then reporting companies may have to comply with the CTA and the Regulations on short notice. And if the Supreme Court ultimately takes up the question whether Congress had the constitutional authority to enact the CTA, then the Court could issue one of the most consequential decisions on Congress's enumerated powers since *National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius*, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).

The Corporate Transparency Act

Congress enacted the CTA as part of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020. Congress noted that, under state law, companies are generally not required to disclose information about their "beneficial owners" — that is, the individuals who ultimately control the entities. National Defense Authorization Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-283 §66402(2). Thus, Congress found, "malign actors" are able to "conceal their ownership of corporations" and use those effectively anonymous corporations for "money laundering," "the financing of terrorism," and "serious tax fraud." *Id.* §66402(3).

To address that concern, the CTA requires any "reporting company" to submit to FinCEN a report containing information about the company and its "beneficial owners." 31 U.S.C. §5336(b). A "beneficial owner" under the CTA is "an individual who, directly or indirectly ... exercises substantial control over the entity" or "owns or controls not less than 25 percent of

Case: 24-40792 Document: 34 Page: 124 Date Filed: 12/17/2024 the ownership interests of the entity," with various exceptions. *Id.* §5336(a)(3). And the CTA defines a "reporting company" as "a corporation, limited liability company, or other similar entity" that is either "created by the filing of a document with a secretary of state or a similar office under the law of a State or Indian Tribe" or "formed under the law of a foreign country and registered to do business in the United States." *Id.* §5336(a)(11)(A).

But the CTA exempts from its disclosure requirements several categories of entities, including banks, companies registered with the Securities Exchange Commission under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and certain companies that have more than 20 full-time employees in the United States. *Id.* §5336(a)(11)(B). The CTA also authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with other officials, to exempt additional "class[es] of entities" if "requiring beneficial ownership information" from those entities "would not be highly useful in national security, intelligence, and law enforcement agency efforts to detect, prevent, or prosecute money laundering, the financing of terrorism, proliferation finance, serious tax fraud, or other crimes." *Id.* §5336(a)(11)(B)(xxiv).

Willful violations of the CTA's disclosure requirements carry civil and criminal penalties. For example, any person that willfully provides false or fraudulent beneficial ownership information or fails "to report complete or updated beneficial ownership information to FinCEN" may receive a \$500 per day civil penalty and up to \$10,000 in fines and two years in federal prison. *Id.* §5336(h)(1), (3)(A). And any person who knowingly discloses or uses beneficial ownership information without authorization may receive a \$500 per day civil penalty, along with a \$250,000 fine and five years in federal prison. *Id.* §5336(h)(2), (3)(B).

A Nationwide Injunction and Other Challenges to the CTA

Plaintiffs have challenged the CTA's constitutionality, to mixed results, in federal district courts around the country. Most recently, a judge in the Eastern District of Texas enjoined the CTA and the Regulations nationwide, concluding that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to adopt the CTA. The four district courts to have considered the constitutionality of the CTA have divided on important constitutional questions.

The courts have split on whether the CTA likely is a valid exercise of Congress's power

Case: 24-40792 Document: 34 Page: 125 Date Filed: 12/17/2024 under the Commerce Clause, with federal judges in Oregon and Virginia holding that it is and judges in Texas and Alabama holding it is not. The courts have also split on whether the CTA likely is authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause, combined with Congress's foreign-affairs or taxing powers, with a judge in Oregon holding that it is, and judges in Texas and Alabama holding that it is not.

A judge in the Eastern District of Texas issued a nationwide injunction

On December 3, 2024, a federal judge granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction in *Texas Top Cop Shop*. The court held that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their constitutional challenge to the CTA and thus enjoined the government from enforcing the CTA or the Regulations and stayed the Regulations' reporting deadlines. As a result, reporting companies need not file reports required by the CTA or the Regulations for as long as the injunction — which the government has appealed — remains in effect.

In issuing the injunction, the court concluded that plaintiffs had shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that Congress exceeded its authority in passing the CTA.

First, the court agreed with plaintiffs that Congress likely lacked the power under the Commerce Clause to enact the CTA. The court explained that the CTA does not regulate the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce because nothing in the statute's text limits its reach to only companies engaged in interstate commerce. Slip Op. 36-40. The court acknowledged Supreme Court precedent holding that Congress may regulate activity under the Commerce Clause if "a 'rational basis' exists for concluding that the regulated activity, taken in the aggregate, substantially impacts interstate commerce." *Id.* at 47 (quoting *Gonzales v. Raich*, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005)). But the court nonetheless concluded that the CTA fails that test, because the law "does not regulate a pre-existing activity, but instead compels a new one." *Id.* at 40-46.

The court also explained why Congress could not enact the CTA under the Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause. As an initial matter, the court held that Congress may use the Necessary and Proper Clause only in tandem with one of its enumerated powers. And none of the enumerated powers the government relied on gave Congress authority to enact the CTA. The court held that the CTA falls outside Congress's power to regulate foreign affairs because the law regulates a domestic issue, not a foreign one: "anonymous existence of

Case: 24-40792 Document: 34 Page: 126 Date Filed: 12/17/2024 companies registered to do business in a U.S. state." *Id.* at 56-60. The court further held that the CTA falls outside Congress's taxing power because the connection between the CTA and the collection of taxes is "tenuous at best." *Id.* at 71.

Having concluded that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits, the court also held that plaintiffs had satisfied the other preliminary injunction factors. The court explained that the costs of complying with a regulation later held to be invalid constitute irreparable harm. And the balance of the equities supported plaintiffs because, in the court's view, a preliminary injunction was necessary to preserve the constitutional status quo.

A judge in the Northern District of Alabama had previously held that the CTA is unconstitutional

Nine months before the court in the Eastern District of Texas issued its injunction, the district court in *National Small Business United v. Yellen*, No. 5:22-cv-01448 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 1, 2024), had held that the CTA is unconstitutional and granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs in their challenge to that law. That is the only case in which a district court has decided the ultimate merits of the CTA's constitutionality (as opposed to ruling in a preliminary-injunction posture), though that decision does not have nationwide effect and provides relief only to the plaintiffs.

The district court's analysis in *National Small Business* resembles the court's reasoning in *Texas Top Cop Shop*. First, the court held that Congress does not have power under the Commerce Clause to enact the CTA. Second, the court held that Congress's foreign-affairs powers could not justify its enactment of the CTA because the CTA regulates "the purely domestic arena of incorporation." Slip Op. 23. Third, the court held that the CTA is not a necessary and proper exercise of Congress's taxing power, because there was not a sufficiently close relationship between that power and the CTA's disclosure provisions.

Judges in the District of Oregon and the Eastern District of Virginia have denied preliminary injunctions, concluding the CTA is likely constitutional

Courts in the District of Oregon and the Eastern District of Virginia have reached different conclusions about the likelihood that the CTA is constitutional.

In Firestone v. Yellen, No. 3:24-cv-1034 (D. Or. Sept. 20, 2024), the court denied a

Case: 24-40792 Document: 34 Page: 127 Date Filed: 12/17/2024 preliminary injunction, holding that plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional challenge.

The court first held that the CTA is likely a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The court noted that it need determine "only whether a 'rational basis' exists" for concluding that "the regulated activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce." Slip Op. 12-13 (quoting *Raich*, 545 U.S. at 22). The CTA likely satisfied that test, in the court's view, because Congress "sought to deter money laundering, the financing of terrorism, and other illicit economic transactions." *Id.* at 14.

The court also held that the CTA is likely constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause, given that "Congress has broad authority to effectuate the government's powers over national security and foreign affairs and to lay and collect taxes." *Id.* at 12. As to Congress's taxing power, the court reasoned that Congress determined that corporate ownership reporting requirements are useful in combatting tax fraud and tax evasion. And as to Congress's foreign-affairs powers, the court explained that Congress rationally concluded that the disclosure requirement is necessary to protect national security and promote U.S. interests abroad.

The district court in *Community Associations Institute v. Yellen*, No. 24-cv-01597 (E.D. Va. Oct. 24, 2024), similarly denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that plaintiffs were not likely to show that the CTA was an invalid exercise of Congress's commerce power. The court did not address whether the CTA was likely valid under Congress's foreign-affairs or taxing powers.

Next Steps and Implications

The government has appealed the nationwide injunction issued in *Texas Top Cop Shop* to the Fifth Circuit. And with the other district court decisions currently on appeal in the Ninth, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits, any disagreement among the courts of appeals in resolving these issues would tee up possible Supreme Court review.

The government has asked for a stay of the injunction pending the *Texas Top Cop Shop* appeal, given the Regulations' previous reporting deadline of January 1, 2025. Thus, for as long as that injunction remains in effect, companies do not face reporting deadlines under

Case: 24-40792 Document: 34 Page: 128 Date Filed: 12/17/2024 the CTA or the Regulations. That could change, however, if the Fifth Circuit or Supreme Court reverses the district court's decision or if a court stays the district court's injunction pending further proceedings.

Meanwhile, appeals from the other three cases are further along. Plaintiffs have filed their opening briefs in the Ninth and Fourth Circuits, in appeals from the district courts' denials of their motions for preliminary injunctions. *See Firestone v. Yellen*, No. 24-6979 (9th Cir.); *Community Association Institute v. Yellen*, No. 24-2118 (4th Cir.). And in *National Small Business United v. Yellen*, No. 24-10736 (11th Cir.), a three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit (Judges Jordan, Newsom, and Brasher) heard oral argument in September 2024 in the government's appeal from the district court's summary judgment ruling holding the CTA unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court would likely grant certiorari and review any court of appeals decision that holds on the merits that the CTA is unconstitutional. It is also possible that the Supreme Court would weigh in on this question earlier, through its emergency docket, if the lower courts deny the government's motion for a stay of the injunction in *Texas Top Cop Shop* and the government makes that request to the Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court ultimately reaches the merits of whether the CTA is a valid exercise of Congress's commerce power, that could be one of the most significant Commerce Clause decisions since *National Federation of Independent Business*, 567 U.S. 519, where the Court held that the Affordable Care Act was a valid exercise of Congress's taxing and spending powers, but not its commerce power.

Conclusion

The district courts that have addressed the issue have disagreed about whether Congress had the constitutional authority to enact the CTA. The nationwide injunction recently entered in *Texas Top Cop Shop* prevents the government from enforcing the CTA and the Regulations until further order from that district court or a higher court. Thus, entities otherwise subject to the CTA do not have to make filings under the CTA while that injunction remains in effect. But those entities should closely follow legal developments to determine their compliance requirements. If the Fifth Circuit or Supreme Court reverses the district court's injunction, or if a court stays the injunction pending further proceedings, these entities

Case: 24-40792 Document: 34 Page: 129 Date Filed: 12/17/2024 would find themselves required to comply with the CTA and the Regulations. And, more broadly, a decision from the Supreme Court striking down the CTA would have profound implications for the scope of Congress's constitutional powers.

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EXHIBIT H









EXHIBIT I

FinCEN Seeks Immediate Stay of Nationwide CTA Injunction

Key Takeaways

- On Dec. 11, 2024, the U.S. government filed a motion requesting immediate stay of that preliminary injunction, indicating it would p seek relief from the Fifth Circuit.

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$\underline{\mathbf{EXHIBIT}\ \mathbf{C}}$

United States District Court

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SHERMAN DIVISION

TEXAS TOP COP SHOP, INC., ET AL.,	§	
	§	
Plaintiffs,	§	
	§	
V.	§	Civil Action No. 4:24-CV-478
	§	Judge Mazzant
MERRICK GARLAND, ATTORNEY	§	
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,	§	
ET AL.,	§	
	§	
Defendants.	§	

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Stay Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal (Dkt. #35). Having considered the Motion, the pleadings, and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the Motion should be **DENIED**.

BACKGROUND

On May 28, 2024, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants, various representatives of the Federal Government and Government entities (collectively, "the Government"), seeking a declaratory judgment that the Corporate Transparency Act ("CTA") and its implementing regulations (the "Reporting Rule") are unconstitutional and an injunction against their enforcement (Dkt. #1). On June 3, 2024, Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against the CTA and Reporting Rule (Dkt. #6). The Government filed a Response (Dkt. #18), Plaintiffs replied (Dkt. #19), and on October 9, 2024, the Court held a hearing on the matter. On December 3, 2024, the Court entered an Order enjoining enforcement of the CTA and Reporting Rule nationwide (Dkt. #30). The Government appealed (Dkt. #32). The Court amended its Order to correct a

minor error that did not impact the Court's analysis or holding (Dkt. #33). The Government filed an Amended Notice of Appeal (Dkt. #34).

At 8:05 p.m. CST on December 11, 2024, the Government filed the instant Motion to Stay Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal (Dkt. #35). In the Motion, the Government asserted that if the Court did not grant a stay of its Order enjoining the CTA and Reporting Rule by December 12 or 13, 2024, the Government would move for a stay of the Order in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (Dkt. #35 at p. 1). Because Plaintiffs had not yet had an opportunity to file a response, the Court Ordered Plaintiffs to respond to the Government's Motion by December 16, 2024, at 12:00 p.m. CST (Dkt. #36). On December 13, 2024, the Government filed a Motion to stay the Court's Order enjoining enforcement of the CTA and Reporting Rule in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Defendants-Appellants' Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, Texas Top Cop Shop v. Garland, No. 24-40792 (5th Cir. Dec. 13, 2024), ECF No. 21. On December 16, 2024, at 8:08 a.m. CST, Plaintiffs timely filed their Response in Opposition to the Government's Motion to Stay Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. #37). On December 17, 2024, the Government filed its Reply (Dkt. #38). The Court now takes up the Government's Motion (Dkt. #35).

LEGAL STANDARD

"A stay pending appeal is extraordinary relief for which [the movant] bear[s] a heavy burden." Plaquemines Par. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 84 F.4th 362, 372 (5th Cir. 2023) (internal quotations omitted). "A stay is an intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review, and accordingly is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result to the appellant." Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). A stay is "an exercise of judicial discretion, and the propriety of its issue is dependent upon the

circumstances of the particular case. The party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion." Id. at 433-34 (internal quotations omitted). Where "there is even a fair possibility that the stay . . . will work damage to someone else[,]" the party seeking a stay "must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward." Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. at 248, 255 (1936); see Ind. State Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC, 556 U.S. 960, 961 (2009) (internal quotations omitted) ("'A stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result.' It is instead an exercise of judicial discretion, and the 'party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.").

In determining whether to grant a stay, district courts must consider four factors (known in the Fifth Circuit as the "Nken factors"): "(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies." *Plaquemines Par.*, 84 F.4th at 373 (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at 434). The Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit alike have made clear that "'[t]he first two factors . . . are the most critical." Id. (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at 434). In articulating this standard, the Fifth Circuit has stated that it is "important[]" to recall that:

on motions for stay pending appeal the movant need not always show a "probability" of success on the merits; instead, the movant need only present a substantial case on the merits when a serious legal question is involved and show that the balance of the equities *weighs heavily* in favor of granting the stay.

Id. (quoting Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, 565 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981)). With these principles in mind, the Court addresses each factor in turn.

ANALYSIS

I. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

As the Court has acknowledged, this case involves a novel constitutional question of first impression in the Fifth Circuit (Dkt. #33 at p. 3). Though Plaintiffs brought an array of challenges against the CTA and Reporting Rule, to date, the Court has only addressed Plaintiffs' argument that the CTA exceeds Congress's enumerated powers (Dkt. #33 at p. 79). As discussed in detail by the Court's Order enjoining the CTA and Reporting Rule (Dkt. #33), both are likely unconstitutional; Plaintiffs have thus carried their burden to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. The Government has not.

The Government urges that the Court reconsider its conclusion on the merits but reiterates arguments that the Court has already rejected. For example, in the context of the Commerce Clause, the Government has still not articulated what activity the CTA regulates (See Dkt. #35 at p. 6). Similarly, in the context of the Necessary and Proper clause, the Government has yet to offer a viable argument that the CTA derives from one of Congress's enumerated powers and is a proper exercise of that power, as it must (See Dkt. #35). See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 147 (2010). Broadly, the Government has not offered any tenable explanation for how the CTA and Reporting Rule align with our dual system of government. The Government also argues that the Court did not apply the proper standard for a facial challenge (Dkt. #35 at p. 6). But at this juncture, there appears "no set of circumstances" under our written Constitution in which Congress would have the power to enact the CTA. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).

The Government further argues that the Court erred in "not giv[ing] sufficient weight" to Congress's findings (Dkt. #35 at p. 7). But the Government does not cite any authority for the notion that Congress's findings alone may authorize it to legislate however it so wishes. In fact,

countless cases discussing Congress's constitutional limits provide the exact opposite. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) ("[T]he existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation.") (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 ("Simply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not make it so.")). The Court gave Congress its due deference but acted as it must to fulfill its judicial responsibility.

Further, while the Government contends that the Court erred simply because it disagreed with the reasoning in Firestone v. Yellen, No. 3:24-cv-1034-SI, 2024 WL 4250192 (D. Or. Sept. 20, 2024) and Cmty. Ass'ns Inst. v. Yellen, No. 1:24-cv-1597, 2024 WL 4571412 (E.D. Va. Oct. 24, 2024), the Government overlooks the reasoning in *Nat'l Small Bus. United v. Yellen*, 721 F. Supp. 3d 1260 (N.D. Ala. 2024) ("NSBU v. Yellen"). The Court believes that the reasoning in NSBU v. Yellen is persuasive and correct. This disagreement among the district courts is not enough to suggest that this Court erred.

The Government finally submits that the Court erred in enjoining the CTA and Reporting Rule nationwide (Dkt. #35 at pp. 7-8). Once more, the Court stands behind its Order (Dkt. #33). The Government is right to point out the concerns with nationwide injunctions (See Dkt. #35 at p. 7). The Court acknowledges those concerns. The Court enjoined enforcement of the CTA and Reporting Rule nationwide because it appears appropriate under the law and the facts of this case.¹ The Government's Reply argues that "Defendants did not concede that [nationwide] relief was

¹ Ironically, the Declaration the Government filed in support of its Motion shows why anything short of nationwide relief would be impracticable. Though, of course, the scope of an injunction does not turn on practicalities alone. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979). The Declaration of Andrea Gacki states that "[r]eporting companies must clearly understand and have certainty about their compliance obligations for a reporting regime to be effective" (Dkt. #35-1 at p. 9). After all, the AMLA sought "to establish uniform beneficial ownership information reporting requirements." Pub. L. No. 116-283, div. F. 134 Stat. 4547, § 6002(5) (2021) (emphasis added).

necessary or appropriate" (Dkt. #38 at p. 1). The Court agrees, which is why the Court did not categorize the Government's statement that enjoining enforcement of the CTA and Reporting Rule only against Plaintiffs, including NFIB's members, was "'effectively' a form of nationwide relief" as a concession (Dkt. #38 at p. 1-2; Dkt. #33 at p. 75). This does not change the practical effect of Plaintiffs' request, nor does it persuade the Court that the scope of the injunction is inappropriate under the facts and circumstances of this case.

As the Court has decided, the merits favored Plaintiffs when the Court issued its injunction. Today is no different. The Government has not "made a strong showing that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits." See Plaquemines Par., 84 F.4th at 373. Accordingly, the first Nken factor weighs against issuance of a stay.

II. The Equities

Turning to the remaining factors (the "equities"), the Court determines that a stay is not warranted. As the Court has concluded and as precedent indicates, the public interest lies in protecting the public from laws that are likely unconstitutional, and Plaintiffs will face irreparable harm if the Court were to grant a stay (which would effectively nullify its prior Order) (See Dkt. #33). Thus, the third and fourth *Nken* factors weigh against issuance of a stay.

Accordingly, the Court turns to the Second *Nken* factor—the risk of the Government suffering irreparable harm (the only remaining factor). Plaquemines Par., 84 F.4th at 373. The Government contends that the burdens that it has undertaken to achieve compliance with the CTA constitute irreparable injury if the Court does not permit the CTA and Reporting Rule to become effective once again by issuing a stay. The Government advances two broad arguments under this factor. First, the Government argues that an injunction against laws "enacted by representatives of [the] people" constitutes irreparable harm (Dkt. #35 at p. 3) (internal quotation omitted).

Documentt 34

Indeed, as the Fifth Circuit has stated, "[w]hen a statute is enjoined, the [Government] necessarily suffers the irreparable harm of denying the public interest in the enforcement of its laws." Book People, Inc. v. Wong, 91 F.4th 318, 341 (5th Cir. 2024).

Second, the Government argues that "the injunction would significantly disrupt FinCEN's implementation of the CTA, and FinCEN would not be able to fully remediate that disruption even if the injunction were lifted at the conclusion of the appeal" (Dkt. #35 at p. 3). In support of this point, the Government notes that FinCEN has engaged in nationwide media outreach in an attempt to achieve compliance with the CTA and it has expended \$4.3 million dollars to date in furtherance of those efforts (Dkt. #35 at p. 4). The Government also argues that the injunction would "prevent the United States from fulfilling international standards for countering money laundering and terrorist financing" (Dkt. #35 at p. 5). That is a familiar argument that the Court addressed in its Order (See Dkt. #33 at pp. 56-65).

But for the first time in the life of this case, the Government has offered more than a threadbare claim that the CTA helps the United States comply with international standards. The Declaration of Andrea Gacki, the Director of FinCEN, which the Government attached as an exhibit to its Motion to Stay states:

The United States is currently preparing for its upcoming Financial Action Task Force ("FATF") mutual evaluation, with its written technical submission currently due mid-2025. The United States is a founding member of FATF, which is the leading international, inter-governmental task force whose purpose is the development and promotion of international standards and the effective implementation of legal, regulatory, and operational measures to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, the financing of proliferation, and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. Among other things, FATF has established standards on transparency and BOI [(Beneficial Ownership Information)] of legal persons, intended to deter and prevent the misuse of corporate vehicles.

(Dkt. #35-1 at pp. 9-10). The Declaration also states that FATF rated the United States "noncompliant" with FATF's "requirements" (Dkt. #35-1 at p. 10). According to Andrea Gacki's Declaration, the injunction "risks causing the United States to receive negative ratings on related portions of an upcoming FATF evaluation" (Dkt. #35-1 at p. 10). A lower rating, according to the Declaration, could result in the United States being "added to the FATF grey list, a public list of countries with significant failings in their AML/CFT [(anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism)] regimes" (Dkt. #35-1 at p. 10). That, the Declaration argues, "would undermine the United States' ability to push other countries to make reforms to their AML/CFT regimes..." (Dkt. #35-1 at p. 10). Finally, the Declaration notes that, for "nearly a decade," FATF has identified the lack of BOI reporting as the "most fundamental gap" in the United States's AML/CFT regime (Dkt. #35-1 at p. 10). Though Plaintiffs did not stipulate to the factual contentions in the Declaration, their Response does not dispute those statements.

The efforts that FinCEN has made to increase compliance with the CTA since the Reporting Rule have gone into effect appear to be significant by their terms and, of course, in service of a laudable end. FinCEN has been collecting BOI reports since January 1, 2024 (Dkt. #35-1 at p. 5). And while Plaintiffs have not provided the Court with any reason to suggest that the Government could completely remediate any harm as a result of the injunction, the law is clear that "it is always in the public interest to prevent a violation of a party's constitutional rights." Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 458 n.9 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1132 (10th Cir. 2012)), overruled on other grounds by Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 597 U.S. 215 (2022). Moreover, irreparable injury is not dispositive in deciding whether to grant a stay. *Ind. State Police Pension Tr.*, 556 U.S at 961. Accordingly, any interest the Government has in preserving its efforts in furtherance of the CTA are superseded by the CTA's grave constitutional flaws. Thus, on balance, the factors do not favor issuance of a stay.

Notwithstanding this four-factor analysis, the Court is mindful of the Fifth Circuit's statement in *Ruiz v. Estelle* that, at this stage, the movant "need not always show a 'probability' of success on the merits; instead, the movant need only present a substantial case on the merits when a serious legal question is involved and show that the balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of granting the stay." *Plaquemines Par.*, 84 F.4th at 373 (quoting *Ruiz*, 650 F.2d at 565). This case, no doubt, presents a serious legal question. Given the Court's prior reasoning (Dkt. #33), it does not appear that the Government has a "substantial case on the merits," at least as to Plaintiffs' enumerated powers challenge. But even assuming arguendo that the Government does have a substantial case on the merits, the equities here do not "weigh heavily" in favor of granting a stay. See id. Accordingly, the Court will not stay its Order enjoining enforcement of the CTA and Reporting Rule (Dkt. #33).

CONCLUSION

It is therefore **ORDERED** that Defendants' Motion to Stay Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal (Dkt. #35) is hereby **DENIED**.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

SIGNED this 17th day of December, 2024.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE